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Three topics related to the role of family in economic outcomes are
examined. In Chapter 1, a twins instrument is used to measure the effect of
an additional infant on womens housework and market work hours and the on
time use of others in the family. Having an additional child increases womens
weekly housework by 3.5 hours and reduces womens weekly leisure hours by
1.2 hours. Spouses have an increase in housework of 1.1 hours but no reduction
in leisure. Chapter 2 develops a simple model to explain how one way in which
self-employment might be advantageous to immigrants. Immigrants with poor
English language skills cannot realize their full productive ability when dealing
with English speakers. However, forming a partnership with someone else who
speaks both languages could allow specialization of jobs that would give both
a higher wage. The presence of both good and poor English skills in the
iv
household presents the opportunity for mutually beneficial cooperation. The
range of English skills of workers in the household is positively associated with
higher self-employment probabilities for men, particularly for households with
more earners. Individuals have a higher probability of being self-employed if
they have someone with different language skills in the household. Chapter 3
examines the effect of additional siblings on childrens education using twins
instruments. Additional siblings have a significant negative impact on the
education of younger children. Afterwards, children catch up. Closely spaced
siblings have a larger negative effect. There is evidence that a girls education
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The family plays an important role in the economic lives of individuals.
Families cooperate in home production and the raising of children, allowing
specialization of tasks within the household and in the market. They share
resources of time, money, and human capital. There is ample evidence that
family members bargain among themselves. Thus, even in a context of the
maximization of individual utility, the family unit influences the economic
decisions and outcomes of its members.
Some of the most important questions concerning the home produc-
tion role of the family deal with the impact of additional children. However,
examining the impact of household fertility on other outcomes poses several
problems. Underlying preferences and beliefs about social roles for men and
women are likely to influence both fertility decisions and decisions about edu-
cation, choice of partner, occupational choice, and sector of work. Thus, while
women with more children tend to work more in home and have children with
less education, it cannot be said how much of the difference between them
and women with fewer children is due to the presence of additional children
without accounting for this endogeneity. Endogeneity will also result if family
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decisions are taken simultaneously with decisions about how many children to
have. While these problems are commonly acknowledged, it is difficult to find
valid instruments for household fertility, and there are few data sets which
contain information on the household and are large enough to use instruments
which do exist.
Another important question is how the family influences work deci-
sions. Decisions about self-employment may be related to the family in sev-
eral ways. Families may contribute resources which enable self-employment,
such as financial support, knowledge and experience, and access to benefits.
Self-employment also seems to provide flexibility for women who have small
children.
In this thesis, I address three questions related to the role of family in
home production, the self-employment decision, and children’s education. The
second chapter provides an exogenous estimate of the amount of time children
cost in terms of additional housework and reduced leisure. The third chapter
creates a model in which self-employment allows cooperation between family
members with different English skills. The fourth chapter investigates whether
additional children hurt the education of siblings.
In the second chapter, “The Effect of a Marginal Newborn on Family
Time Use: A Twins Approach,” I examine the time cost of a marginal child.
Understanding women’s housework response to children is important on its
own because housework and child care are important parts of women’s total
welfare. More information on women’s time use in the home may also have
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practical applications in designing work arrangements that enable women to
combine having children and market work. Having an additional measure of
the cost of children would also be good, given that most measures of child cost
have focused on financial factors.
However, näıve estimates of the change in work hours when a child is
born are likely to be biased because women may make decisions about how
many children to have and the division of time between the market, housework,
and leisure at the same time. Underlying preferences that influence both
choices also lead to endogeneity and biased estimates.
To get around this problem, I use a twins experiment to estimate the
effect of an additional child on housework hours. The birth of twins acts as
an exogenous shock to total household fertility. I analyze the effect of young
children 15 months of age and younger. This focuses on children when they are
likely to have the largest impact on a woman’s time and avoids confusing the
issue of the cost of child with decisions about future fertility. Others have used
twins as a natural experiment to examine women’s market work decisions, but
no analysis has provided an estimate of the effect of an exogenous additional
child on women’s housework hours.
The analysis is enabled by using a unique question from the Mexican
Survey of Urban Employment (ENEU), a large household dataset with a panel
of up to 15 months. This survey asks family members how many hours were
spent in housework in the previous week. I compare the housework hours of
parents of twin infants with those of singleton infants. The short panel also
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allows me to obtain an OLS estimate for the effect of moving from 0 to 1 child
for women who will have one child within a year of being surveyed.
Mexico is an interesting country for this analysis because it combines
elements of a more traditional, developing country with those of a developed
industrialized society. Until relatively recently, birth rates in Mexico were high
and women worked primarily in the home or informal sectors. Since the 1960’s,
Mexico has undergone a dramatic transformation in household structure and
women’s time use. Average family size has decreased, while women’s labor
force participation has increased dramatically. Parker and Pederzini (2001)
claim that from 1970 to 1990 Mexico had the greatest increase in women’s
labor force participation in Latin America. An expansion of opportunities in
jobs requiring relatively more skills have contributed to women’s increasing
education rates. This means that there is large variation in household struc-
tures in Mexico, from very traditional households where women have a strong
focus on home production to smaller families where women work outside of
the home.
I find that small children have a significant positive effect on women’s
housework hours, but less than simple OLS estimates indicate. A small child
increases housework for women by 3.5 hours a week. About 1.3 hours comes
from a reduction in leisure, and the rest from a reduction in work hours. There
is no significant impact on men’s housework hours. There is also no differential
effect on hours of the child’s gender. These results are rather small, and suggest
that other factors, such as timing of child care activities, may have a greater
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impact on women’s work than the total hours would suggest.
The third chapter, “Helping the Family: Immigrant English Skills and
Self-Employment,” develops a model of self-employment as a coping strategy
for immigrants. This chapter explores the hypothesis that self-employment al-
lows immigrant family members with complementary language skills to tailor
jobs to maximize total income. Workers who cannot speak English fluently
are less productive in the U.S. labor market than they would be working in
their own language, and there is a wage penalty to poor English skills both in
market work and in self-employment. However, such workers could increase
productivity by forming a partnership with someone who spoke English well
and could take over aspects of the job that required English skills. The fam-
ily is the natural basis for forming such partnerships, both because family
members provide an available pool of co-linguists and because monitoring and
transaction costs are less for family members. If the model holds, individ-
uals from families with a mix of English skills should be more likely to be
self-employed.
The U.S. Census offers a possibility to examine this hypothesize by
including detailed questions about respondents’ country of origin and native
language, self-employment status, and English ability.
The data show that household language skills are important for the self-
employment decision. Controlling for personal characteristics and the average
age, experience in the U.S., and education of all workers in the household, the
range of English skills of workers in the household has a positive association
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with men’s self-employment probability. The effect is particularly strong in
households with more earners. Individuals have a higher probability of being
self-employed if they have someone with different language skills in the house-
hold. Poor speakers are more likely to be self-employed the more good or very
good English speakers are in the household, and very good English speakers
are more likely to be self-employed the more nonspeakers are poor speakers
are in the household. The result is robust across alternative specifications and
the general pattern holds for all immigrants except those born in Europe.
These results indicate that policy makers wishing to use self-employment
as a vehicle for poverty alleviation may wish to focus not only on individuals,
but on household level skills. It emphasizes the importance of family for in-
tegration into the work force, and that those without family support or with
smaller families may be more vulnerable economically. Finally, it provides
evidence that there are secondary benefits to language training.
The fourth chapter is “Quality vs. Quantity: the Effect of an Additional
Child on Sibling Educational Attainment.” The presence of additional children
in the family could reduce the education of siblings for several reasons. Having
more children reduces the level of monetary and time resources available for
each child and may increase the demand for older siblings to work instead of
study. However, the hypothesis that there is a tradeoff between the quantity
of children in a family and their “quality” or educational level is difficult to
estimate because family size is likely to be correlated with unobserved variables
related to parents’ decisions about education and family size. Parents who
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want large families may place a different value on education, or the education
of women may influence both their decisions about how many children to have
and the level of education they desire for each child.
A twins instrument provides a way to measure the effect of an additional
sibling on its own apart from underlying family preferences. Using the ENEU
data set, I examine how an additional child affects the education of siblings.
I also examine whether closely spaced siblings hurt each other’s education
and whether having a young child in the household negatively impacts the
education of teenage girls.
Again, the Mexican example provides interesting insight into a devel-
oping economy with both traditional and modern elements. Mexico has a well
developed public schooling system which has expanded mandatory primary
school coverage across the entire country since 1960. Secondary school is also
compulsory in Mexico. However, there are still strong competing pressures on
children’s time, and a significant number children begin helping out early in
both work in the house and income generating activities. Knaul (2001) esti-
mates that 24.1% of men and 9.6% of women 18-39 began working before the
age of 12 in 1995, not including contributions to housework. An additional
child might be expected to have a larger effect in this context than it might
in the United States and other more industrialized countries.
The data does not provide support for the quality-quantity model.
There is a negative effect on the years of completed schooling relative to similar
children who do not have twin siblings, but only for children 6–11. Children
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catch up and there is no observed effect by the time children are 12–15 years of
age. In fact, in some specifications additional children seem to be associated
with higher educational attainment. This does not mean there is no negative
effect — there may be biases which would tend to lower the magnitude of the
effect of an additional sibling or to make it more positive. There is no evidence
that girls are hurt by having young siblings. Having an additional close sibling
has a large negative effect. When siblings are closely spaced, a younger sibling
is hurt more in terms of education than a older sibling. However, even in this
case, the effect diminishes as children get older.
This suggests that siblings do have an effect on a child’s education,
but primarily when they are young. It may be that they are competing for re-
sources and pulling each other back. Alternatively, mothers with an additional
small child may have a lower cost of keeping children at home longer. How-
ever, in the context of a fairly developed public education system, it does not
appear that additional children reduce siblings’ years of completed education
in the long run.
This research shows the importance both of considering the role of fam-
ily in economic outcomes and in finding ways to account for the endogeneity
of many variables of interest in examining the family. An additional child has
less impact than might be expected on women’s time use and the education
of siblings when endogeneity is controlled for. However, there are significant
short-term results suggesting that the total fertility has less of a role in the
context of Mexico than the presence of a small child at any given moment.
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There is evidence of specialization both in the greater role that women take in
child care and in the evidence on English skills of immigrant households. Fam-
ily members are able to cooperate to increase welfare. This type of cooperation
shows an advantage of organizing as a family not only in home production,
but in some instances in market production as well.
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Chapter 2
The Time Cost of a Marginal Newborn A
Twins Approach
2.1 Introduction
How much time women spend taking care of children is an important
question. Many women spend much of their work time in home production
activities. Even women who work full-time in the market often devote a sub-
stantial number of hours to work in the home as well. Given the amount of
time spent on housework and the significance it has for women’s well-being,
it would be good to have reliable estimates of how family structure influences
housework hours. The effect of an additional child on housework hours is of
particular interest. Not only does child care make up a large percent of house-
work hours, but children may be the primary reason women decide to remain
in the home.
An estimate of the time cost of children would also be useful in un-
derstanding women’s market labor supply decisions. The disproportionate
responsibility women take in caring for children influences broader decisions
about whether to stay in the home or work and what types of work to take.
Because of this, child care responsibilities are often seen as a key factor under-
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lying differences in men’s and women’s labor market outcomes. Young women
who want a family expect that they will spend substantial amounts of time
caring for children and the home, which influences their choice of education
and occupation. They may seek jobs that offer flexibility or low penalties for
periodic absences from the market, but lower wages. A concentration of women
in these occupations can further depress pay scales. The effort and flexibility
that children demand reduce the effort women can expend in market labor,
and women who take time off from work to care for children have less overall
experience and fewer promotional opportunities. These factors work to re-
enforce women’s comparative advantage in the home relative to men, leading
women to specialize even more in home production.
There are advantages to producing many child-related inputs in the
home rather than purchasing them on the market, especially when children are
small. Technological advances and modernization have created a wide range
of substitutes for other aspects of home production, but market alternatives
remain imperfect substitutes for family-provided child care. Some aspects of
child care, such as bonding with the child, are unavailable on the market.
Substitutes that do exist, such as babysitters and child care, are difficult to
monitor. The cost of even a short period of poor care can be extremely high.
Thus, it is likely that even parents with high opportunity costs will increase
home production when they have a child.
Given the concern over finding ways to make it easier for women com-
bine work and family, any information which contributes to understanding
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how children affect women’s time use in the home is important. Employers
increasingly realize the value of offering flexible work schedules and other in-
centives to retain employees who have small children. If women were able to
maintain stronger ties to the workplace while having children, the long-term
costs of a child would be lower.
This paper analyzes the impact of a marginal newborn on the hourly
hours of housework and market work of women and their spouses, accounting
for the endogeneity of the decision to have a child. The effect on housework
hours is of primary interest. There are few estimates of the effect of children
on work in the home, as opposed to the labor market, and none has accounted
for the potential endogeneity of child timing. This paper takes advantage of a
question on housework hours in a large panel survey to estimate the effect of
an exogenous child on housework hours, using the birth of a twin as a shock
to child spacing.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Theoretical Basis for Household Time Allocation
Reuben Gronau (1977) provides a theoretical framework for under-
standing household time adjustments in response to the addition of a child.
The model allows individuals to spend time in market work, household work,
and leisure. Leisure is something undertaken for its own sake, while work,
whether in the home or market, is something one would rather not do and
which is at least theoretically substitutable with a market good. Children
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change the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and goods as well as
shifting the profitability of home production relative to market production of
goods.
Thus, there are two decisions following the addition of a child to the
household: how much more (or less) to work, and what is the right mix of
market and home production. The theory does not offer predictions on the
direction of the change in total work hours in response to an additional child.
Children might enhance the value of leisure time, causing parents to work less.
On the other hand, additional children might increase the utility of goods,
whether home-produced goods (such as a cleaner house) or those purchased
on the market. In this case, parents would work more. Gronau assumes that
an additional child reduces the relative value of leisure, or, in his terminology,
that children are goods intensive. The direction of the second effect is clearer.
Because children increase the value of the woman’s time at home relative to
her time in the market, women’s work time goes down and time spent in
housework increases, at least until children are older and market substitutes
for home production are cheaper.
If men and women were equal in all ways, there is no reason that their
response to a child would be different on average. However, as Becker (1985)
notes, even very small differences in comparative advantage between home
and market production can lead to large differences in labor market - and
home production - outcomes. If men, for whatever reason, have comparative
advantage outside the household, then their response to a child will tend to be
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to work more in the market. Depending on the relative profitability of home
production, however, they may also increase work in the home.
2.2.2 Empirical Approaches to Estimating Time Use
Estimating the marginal effect of an additional child is difficult because
children are likely to be endogenous to the housework hours decision. First,
decisions about children and about housework and labor supply hours are
likely to be jointly determined. This relates not only to total fertility, but also
to the timing of births. It is reasonable to expect that women choose to have
children at times when there is a low cost to housework. A related problem is
that people with underlying preferences for more children may have different
preferences for work in the home versus work in the market.
As a result, simple OLS estimators are likely to be biased and incon-
sistent. The size and direction of the bias are difficult to determine, because
many of the variables that influence housework hours are also correlated with
the desire to have a new child. Some intuition can be gained by examining a
simple model in which women’s change in housework hours in response to a
new child is influenced by preferences for a more traditional household with
women working primarily in the home, which are unobserved. If this is the
only unobserved variable, the correct specification would be:
HW = α1 + β1κ + β2φ + X
′βk+2 + ε
where HW represents women’s housework hours, κ is an indicator rep-
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resenting the birth of an additional child, X is a vector of personal and house-
hold characteristics, and φ is the unobserved variable. If φ is uncorrelated
with other variables influencing housework hours (which is this case is un-
likely), leaving φ out of an hours equation on the presence of a new child (κ)
and other explanatory variables will lead to a bias on the coefficient on κ of:
BIAS(βk?) = βφ(COV (κ, φ))/V AR(κ).
The coefficient βφ is positive if women who are more traditional work
more hours in the home. The direction of the bias depends on the sign of
COV (κ, φ), which should also be positive if more traditional women want a
larger family. If women with more traditional households are more efficient in
the house, however, then the covariance would be negative. In this case, OLS
will overestimate the marginal effect of a child.
There is no empirical evidence on the endogeneity of children to deci-
sions about housework hours. The empirical evidence on whether total fertility
is endogenous in the labor supply equation is mixed. Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1980b) compare the results of regressions of a clearly exogenous instrument
(the incidence of twins in the first birth) to OLS estimates and find that for
children under six OLS substantially underestimates the effect of fertility on
women’s labor force participation. They take this as evidence that fertility is
endogenous. However, Mroz (1987) finds evidence against the endogeneity of
children on women’s total work hours using U.S. data from the 1975 PSID. His
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estimates of the effect of wage on women’s market work hours are virtually the
same whether children are treated as being endogenous or not. Nonetheless,
the theoretical argument remains compelling, and it has become common in
the women’s labor supply literature to treat fertility as potentially endogenous
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a, 1980b), Angrist and Evans (1998), Jacobsen,
Pearce and Rosenbloom (1999)).
One approach to overcoming the endogeneity problem has been to use
the incidence of twins as an exogenous shock to fertility. Because the proba-
bility a woman has twins over her lifetime increases with the number of births
she has, these papers typically use either a twins-ratio instrument or com-
pare the incidence of twins in a given birth, usually the first. Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (1980a) use a twins-ratio instrument to test the quality-quantity model
of Becker and Lewis, estimating the sign of the effect of a twin on children’s
education and household expenditures. Bronars and Grogger (1994) apply a
twins-first technique to the U.S. Census PUMS, providing many more twins
and enabling them to produce more precise estimates of the effect of a marginal
child. Gangadharan and Rosenbloom (1996) use the incidence of twins in the
first birth in the U.S. Census PUMS to examine the effect of an unexpected
child on married women’s labor supply, finding that children have a transitory
effect on labor force participation, but lasting effects on wages and earnings.
Jacobsen, Pearce, and Rosenbloom (1999) reach similar conclusions using a
twins-first methodology on the 1970 and 1980 census. Grogger and Bronars
(1997) use a twins-first experiment to look at the effect of welfare payments
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on the marriage and fertility of unwed mothers.
Another approach is to use child sex ratios as an instrument for fertil-
ity. This method relies on families’ preferences for a variety of child gender
or for children of a given gender. In Mexico and the U.S. , couples who have
two girls or two boys as their first two children are more likely to have a third
child than couples who have a girl and a boy. Angrist and Evans (1998) use
1980 and 1990 Census data to compare the estimates of the labor supply ef-
fects of children obtained by the twins and the children sex ratio instruments.
They find that both instruments give an estimate of the reduction of female
labor supply which is less than the OLS estimate. Comparing the twins and
sex ratio results, they find the difference can be attributed to differences in
child age. Lee (2004) uses the sex of the firstborn child in Korea as an instru-
ment to measure the effect of fertility on labor supply outcomes and siblings’
educational attainment, relying on a preference for sons.
However, studies of the effect of children on household work hours have
not accounted for potential endogeneity. A reasonably large sample is needed
for either twins or child gender ratios to be used as a viable instrument. Typ-
ically, data sets large enough to allow use of either a twins experiment or a
sibling sex ratio instrument do not include information on time spent in the
household. It is difficult to find other instruments correlated with the incidence
of fertility or a new child but not with other variables influencing housework
hours. Available estimates of the effect of a child on housework hours have
relied on simple OLS or comparison of means, which are likely to be biased.
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2.2.3 Empirical Evidence on Children and Market and Housework
Hours
The empirical evidence shows a pattern consistent with the theoretical
predictions. The direction of responses is similar across different methodolo-
gies, data sets, and countries. Children tend to decrease women’s labor force
participation and labor hours, but the strength of the effect depends strongly
on the child’s age. After five years of age, there is little or no effect on women’s
participation or hours. Angrist and Evans (1998) find that the birth of a third
child decreases the probability a woman works. However, these effects, while
large and highly significant for young children, were not apparent for children
over four years old. Jacobsen, Pearce and Rosenbloom (1999) find that an
additional child reduces both weeks worked and hours worked for mothers
with children between the ages of 0-2 and 3-5. Women with an additional
older child show no reduction in work hours. Numerous other researchers
have documented the decrease in women’s labor force participation caused
by a small child (Jacobsen-Pearce-Rosenbloom (1999), Rosenzweig/Wolpin
(1980b), Schultz (1978), Lehrer (1992)). Most studies have found that chil-
dren have virtually no effect on men’s labor supply (Angrist and Evans (1998),
Pencavel (1986), Gronau (1976a) Jacobsen et al. 1998)). However, some have
found a small positive effect on men’s labor supply. Lundberg and Rose (2002)
find that children do increase men’s wage rate by 4.2% and annual market work
by 38 hours. However, they find that most of the effect is in response to the
first two children, and that additional children have little effect. Moreover,
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hours and wage rates are higher in response to sons rather than daughters.
The available empirical evidence on housework also supports the the-
oretical predictions. Children tend to increase women’s work in the home
(a strong positive effect) and decrease market work hours and participation
(generally measured more weakly).
Gronau (1977) and Browning (1992) provide a summary of some of the
results. The magnitude of the estimates varies considerably depending on the
survey type and method used, as shown in Table 2.1. Hunt and Kiker (1984)
find that an additional child increases combined housework and child care of
a child 0-2 by only 7.8 hours. Hill and Stafford (1980) find that a child 0-2
increases women’s child care hours by 7.4 hours and housework hours by 3.3
hours for women with a high school education and 9.3 hours of child care and
7.2 hours of housework for college-educated women. Souza-Poza (2001) finds
a child 0-1 years old increases women’s housework by 5.9 hours and child care
by an additional 12.13 hours. These studies use either OLS or a comparison
of means for women with different characteristics. Kooreman and Kapteyn
(1984) find a positive effect of a small child on women’s housework hours
and a negative effect on her leisure hours, but no effect on men’s time use.
Holmes and Tiefenthaler (1997) point out that the time cost of first children
is higher than the cost of later children due to economies of scale, although
their estimate of the cost of a first child - 43 hours - is implausibly large.
There is less information on men’s housework, and the studies that
have been done suggests children have little or no effect on men’s housework.
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There are some exceptions, however, suggesting that additional small children
do increase men’s time spent in house care, although not in other types of
housework, and not for older children. Souza-Poza (2001) finds that Swiss
men provide from 1.4-2.5 extra hours of child care a week for each additional
child six and younger, while additional children 14-20 are associated with
almost three hours less of housework a week. Hill and Stafford (1980), using
the 1975-1976 University of Michigan Time Use Survey, find evidence that
college educated men put in 2-2.5 hours of child care weekly for children under
5. Bianchi (2000) cites evidence from the U.S. , Europe and Australia that
indicates that men are spending much more time in child care now than several
decades ago.
2.3 Methodology
I use a twins experiment to measure the effect of an marginal small
child on housework hours. The twins approach is preferable to the sibling sex
ratio instrument, since the gender composition of children is likely to itself
influence household hours, making it an inappropriate instrument in this case.
I examine the time cost of children between the ages of 0 and 15 months.
There are several reasons to look at very young children. The empirical ev-
idence suggests that children have the greatest effect on time use under the
age of two, so examining women with children of this age in more detail is
worthwhile. Second, considering the effect of children younger than 15 months
considerably simplifies the analysis, since parents have not had time to have ad-
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ditional children. Additional children would change the amount of time spent
with the twin, introducing new questions about economies of scale. While it is
easy to adjust coefficients to account for the fact the average fertility of fam-
ilies who have twins converges with time to the average fertility of singleton
parents, having twins might influence fertility decisions in other ways. For
example, twins are more likely to be of the same sex than two singleton births.
I can use children from different birth orders, since the chance of a woman
having a twin in a given birth is roughly the same.
In addition, this age range sample is useful because it is a panel and
I have information on women before pregnancy. I can provide OLS estimates
on the effect of moving from no children to one child. Estimates of the time
costs of children taken from cross section data may confound the difference in
housework hours of different types of women (those who want fewer or more
children) with the actual time cost of the extra child. This is particularly
true of cross-section estimates of the time cost of the first child, which rely on
comparing women with one child to women who may not even want children.
In contrast, panel data allows me to compare the same group of women before
pregnancy and after birth. Moreover, I compare them in a relatively short
time span, when the relative cost of home production is likely to be similar.
Thus, although this estimate is for a selected sample and not the same as the
effect if children were randomly distributed among women of childbearing age,
the OLS estimate itself has already addressed two sources of bias. Although
the sample is still selected, it is representative of women who do have children.
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Therefore, the OLS estimate is informative in itself.
The effect I am measuring is the short-term effect of having an ad-
ditional young child in the family. It is not the effect of higher fertility on
housework hours, which would be a long-run effect. Although the twin may
be a shock to desired fertility for some women (i.e., those who had wanted only
one more child total, and instead had two), for many it is only a shock to child
spacing or timing. This does not matter for measurement of the short-run
effect.
The first regressions estimate a labor supply equation with weekly
housework hours replacing market work hours and additional variables to in-
dicate the birth of a child. The equation is:
Hours = α1 + γ1Singleton + γ2Twin + X
′β + ε
where Hours is weekly hours spent in housework and care of others
in the family, Singleton is an indicator for the presence of a single child 0-15
months old, and Twin is an indicator for the presence of twins 0-15 months
old. The omitted group is women who are not yet pregnant, but who will have
child at some point during the survey. The variables that influence women’s
housework hours included in the vector X are the same as those that influence
their work hours. These are age, education, marital status, state of residence,
and household variables. I also include specifications with interactions between
Singleton and Twin and other variables to test how the impact of other factors
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might change after birth.
The estimate of the marginal effect of a twin is obtained by subtracting
the coefficient on Singleton from the coefficient on Twin in the specification
with no interacted variables. If having a twin is independent of the other vari-
ables which influence household time use, the desired marginal effect would be
simply the difference of the means between women with twins and women with
singleton births. In fact, having a twin is not completely independent of other
factors which could affect time use. The probability of having a twin in a given
birth increases both with the mother’s age and with the number of children
she has had previously. Therefore, mother’s age is generally included when
twins are used an instrument, even though it might be considered endogenous.
Previous studies have not included the number of previous births, although
this should be included for the same reason. I also find that the state of resi-
dence has some correlation with having a twin in this sample, perhaps because
of differences in ethnicity, diet, or infant mortality rates1. All reported regres-
sions include indicator variables for state of residence and the year and quarter
of the interview. Because there might be concerns that mother’s age and the
number of previous births are endogenous, alternate regressions without these
variables for comparison are run for comparison.
1For the twins experiment to be valid, twins need to be distributed randomly regardless
of family characteristics. Age and previous births are not random, but can be controlled for.
However, twins may also result from fertility treatment, which is correlated with income and
other background variables. The effect of spouses’ and own income is insignificant once at
at the time of birth is controlled for. Twins are also born with lower average birth weight
than singletons and may have more medical problems. Because of the way this sample was
selected, tins in which one died or was absent any period are not included.
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OLS is used for women’s housework, men’s market hours, and leisure
hours. Since many observations contain zero hours for women’s work and
men’s housework, a specification which accounted for this might have been
appropriate. I ran several Tobit regressions and found that the results were
very similar. Since calculating marginal effects for the Tobit regressions in-
creased the computational difficulty without a clear benefit, I did not use this
specification for the reported tables. The dependent variables are hours of
housework and market work for individuals. All standard errors are robust
and clustered on the household.
2.4 Data
The data are the Mexican government’s National Survey of Urban Em-
ployment (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, or ENEU) from 1994 to
1999. This is a quarterly household survey collected by the statistical agency
of the Mexican government (Instituto Nacional de Estat́ıstica y Geograf́ıa y
Informática, or INEGI) that interviews approximately 100,000 households in
44 urban areas of Mexico every quarter. Urban areas are defined as those with
more than 2,500 residents, and the survey provides representation for 65%
of Mexico’s total urban population. For cities of more than 100,000 persons,
95% of the population is represented. Households are interviewed every three
months. Each household should be in the survey five times, for a total of up
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to 15 months2. Basic demographic and educational information is collected
on every member of the household, and more detailed information on every
household member twelve years of age and older. In addition to work hours,
information on housework hours is included, enabling this analysis. The exact
question is, “How many hours did you spend on housework and family care
(not for pay) last week?”
2.4.1 Selection of Sample and Twins
The sample consists of women who have a child younger than 15 months
of age. Some women give birth during the time frame of the survey, providing
observations before the birth and even before the pregnancy. I include women
under the age of 50 who have had a child during the period of the survey or
just before the survey and their spouses3. Husbands are matched to wives
through the variables for relationship to household head and marital status.
Unmarried women are also included.
The minimum age for a mother is 12 years old, because data on births
are not available for younger women. The child must be 15 months or younger,
based on an approximation of age. Any periods in which the child is older than
15 months are dropped. I exclude women who have more of their own children
in the family than total births (which could indicate miscoding, stepchildren,
or adoptions), but keep families who have fewer children in the family than
2Some households appear in the data fewer times for unknown reasons. Since the survey
tracks households, not families, some families may also be in the survey less than five times.
3The age cutoffs exclude only 200 women.
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total births.
I identify twins by matching children of the same age, place of birth,
and relationship to the household head. I include only children who have
been in the sample for at least two periods or who are observed entering the
household at the same time to avoid misidentifying closely-spaced children as
twins. Only the youngest child is considered. In families with two children
less than fifteen months of age, the younger child is considered the new child.
The data set provides the age of the child in years, but not in months.
Therefore, the age in months is approximated by using quarters. Children
who are in the survey five quarters are taken as “15-month olds”, although
the actual age range of these children is 12-18 months.
Many women with children in Mexico live in extended families. In
these families, the family patriarch or matriarch is usually listed as the head
of household. When there is more than one wife/husband couple in the house-
hold, parents and children are matched by their relationship to household head
and the proximity of the observations where possible. Households where it is
not possible to assign one or more spouse or child correctly are excluded.
2.5 Descriptive Statistics
The sample of women contains 125,534 observations on 47,847 women
who have recently given birth to a singleton and 1,017 observations on 390
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women who have recently given birth to twins4. There are 110,548 observations
on 42,556 spouses of recent mothers, including 905 observations on 347 recent
fathers of twins. In addition, the data set provides 2,359 observations on
women before pregnancy and 28,835 observations on women during pregnancy.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 give descriptive statistics for parents of singletons vs.
parents of twins. Mothers of twins are on average about 1.8 years older than
mothers of singletons. Other differences are probably due to the difference in
age. For example, twin mothers have .26 more children before having twins.
They also have slightly higher household income and husband income, but
lower own income.
Educational levels are similar — about 8 years of education for each
group. About 88% of all women have a male partner in the house. The
percent of married women is 77% for non-twin mothers and 79% for twin
mothers. In addition, 12.6% of non-twin mothers and 11.5% of twin mothers
are in common-law marriages.
Some 13% of non-twin mothers live with their parents, and 8.4% live
with the husband’s parents. An additional 1.4% live with other relations or
nonrelatives. The rest are either the head of household or the spouse of the
household head. The figures for twin mothers are 10.1% in their parents’ home,
6.4% in the husbands’ parents’, and 1.7% in other relatives’ houses.
4The percentage of twins in the sample is .8, or one twin birth for about 125 singleton
births. For comparison, the twinning rate of whites in the U.S. is 1-1.2%.
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2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics by Birth Period
For women who have a new child during the survey, I have additional
observations before the birth took place, and, in cases where the woman is in
the sample five times and the new child is observed only in the last quarter,
even before pregnancy. I have data on 2,338 non-twin mothers before preg-
nancy, 14,407 during pregnancy, and 47,847 after birth. For twin mothers, I
have information on 21 women before pregnancy, 142 during pregnancy, and
390 after pregnancy5.
Table 2.4 divides the sample into periods according to whether women
are not yet pregnant, are currently pregnant, or have already given birth. The
table includes only women who are in the sample 5 quarters so that the groups
are comparable6.
During pregnancy, total weekly hours drop by about two hours, from
51.72 hours to 49.7 hours. Housework hours go up slightly: mothers work 38.01
hours in the home before pregnancy and 38.92 hours during pregnancy. Market
work hours decrease from 13.51 hours to 10.85 hours on average. Participation
(measured as “being employed,” not on the basis of hours) decreases from 37%
in pre-pregnancy to 31% during pregnancy. For women who continue working,
average work hours are only about half an hour less.
After birth, average housework hours for non-twin mothers increase by
5All women are observed in at least one period after pregnancy.
6Otherwise, pre-pregnant women, who must be in the sample 5 periods to be identified,
appear older tan women who are pregnant, who may be in the sample 2-5 times.
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about 4 hours from pregnancy to 42.8 hours. Total work hours increase by 3
hours. Labor force participation again drops (but only by about 2 percentage
points). For those who work, however, average work hours decrease by only
about .4 hours. Total housework hours increase by 4.3 hours, indicating that
the mother herself bears most of the burden of extra work in the home.
After giving birth, twin mothers have 46.5 hours of average housework,
3.1 hours more than singleton mothers. They have .35 hours less market work.
Average total hours for mothers of twins are 2.7 hours more than for mothers
of singletons.
The equivalent figures for men are presented in Table 2.5. Men’s house-
work hours are much lower than women’s and their market hours are higher,
evidence of specialization. Spouses contribute on average 6.55 hours a week of
housework and 45.8 hours of market work in the pre-pregnancy stage.
2.5.2 Descriptive Statistics by Number of Children
The data show large differences between women with different family
sizes. Women with more children are older, reflecting both that women need
time to have more children and cohort effects. Education drops from an aver-
age of 8.6 years for women who are having their first child to 4 years to women
who have 8 or more previous children. Women with more children seem more
traditional in other ways as well. Fewer of them work, and when they do work
they work fewer hours. It is not clear to what extent these differences are due
to changes in relative costs of being at home versus being in the market, to
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tastes about different lifestyles, or to cohort effects (older women had fewer
educational and work opportunities).
Chart 2.1 shows the pre-birth housework hours for all mothers. Hours
of weekly housework before the birth are increasing in the number of children.
The largest difference is between having 0 and 1 child, which changes the
housework by almost 10 hours per week. The time spent in the house with
an additional child rises more slowly as the total number of children increases,
and after there is little effect for families with five or more children.
Work hours after birth are shown in the uppermost line. The average
time cost of the extra child is represented by the difference between the two
lines. An additional newborn increases the average woman’s housework hours
less for families with more children. For families with more than four children,
an additional newborn seems to have no effect at all in terms of increased work
time for the woman.
The line on the bottom shows the difference between housework hours
for a mother who has given birth to twins and a mother who has given birth
to a singleton. Thus, it represents the time cost of an unexpected child by
number of previous children, not accounting for other factors. Having a twin
in the first two births increases time spent in the household, but by less than
a factor of two. A second twin born as the third child increases housework
less than a second twin born as the second child. However, for twins born in
the third and fourth pregnancy, the additional time per child is more for twins
than for a singleton. For families with more children, the number of mothers
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with twins is too small for a meaningful analysis.
2.6 Regression Results
2.6.1 Women’s Housework Hours
Table 2.6 reports regression results for women’s housework, market
work, and leisure time. Women may change their time use patterns during
pregnancy, so only observations before pregnancy and after birth are included.
The basic specification includes indicator variables for singleton and twin, ed-
ucational and marital status, whether the husband and wife are the heads of
the household or live with parents or other relatives, and the number of other
people in the household.
A singleton birth increases women’s hours of housework by 5.0 hour a
week. Almost all of this comes from work hours, which are reduced by 4.2
hours a week. However, leisure time, defined as total time minus market work
and housework, also goes down by .8 hours a week.
The coefficient on twin indicates a smaller adjustment to housework and
work hours in response to a second child. The increase in housework for the
marginal child is the coefficient on Twin minus the coefficient on Singleton,
or -3.2 additional hours per week, only 63% of the time adjustment to the first
child. It is not possible to tell how much of this difference is due to accounting
for endogeneity, how much to economies of scale, and how much to decreasing
returns to housework in raising children. The work reduction for a twin is also
less, only 2.0 hours or 46% of the OLS effect. Leisure hours, however, drop
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even more — by 1.2 hours.
I also run additional unreported specifications which leave out all vari-
ables except for the mother’s age, number of previous births, and twin and
singleton, which include only the mother’s age, and which include interacted
variables. The estimates for the additional cost of a twin in the other spec-
ifications are similar, ranging from 3.2–3.5 hours more of housework, 2.0–2.2
hours less work, and 1.2–1.3 fewer hours of leisure.
Age is associated with a decrease in housework hours when the number
of previous children is accounted for. After the age of 38, market work hours
are decreasing for women, which could be either because household income is
higher or because of cohort effects. Leisure is decreasing with age until age 35.
Education also matters in the expected way. Women with less than
a high school education do from 3.2–3.3 hours more housework a week than
women with a high school education, while women with a college education
do 1.5 hours less housework a week. Theory predicts that women with more
education will increase housework hours less for an additional child than those
with less education, since staying at home is more costly for them. However,
the interacted variables show the opposite result. Although less educated
women do more housework than those with at least a high school education,
they increase their housework hours less after the birth of a child. This is
in line with other research looking at disaggregated time use that has found
that more educated women do less housework but spend more time in child
care. Angrist and Evans found a similar result: women with more education
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have a stronger labor force reduction in response to an additional child. One
explanation for this may be that educated women value education more for
their children and see parental time inputs as an important part of a child’s
education. Another way to look at this is that education could increase the
value of women’s time spent with children even more than it raises their market
productivity. Also, it may be that women equate their marginal utility instead
of the marginal products of work and home production, and that staying at
home with a small child is a normal good.
Being single is associated with the largest drop in household hours: sin-
gle women do 10.2–10.7 hours less housework a week than married women, and
divorced and separated women do 8.7–9.3 hours less. Both single and divorced
women also do more market work more than married women. However, single
women have 4 hours more leisure in addition, while divorced women increase
their market hours by more than they reduce housework hours. Both single
and divorced women increase housework hours and reduce housework hours
more in response to the birth of a child. Women in common-law marriages
(unión libre) do not spend more time in housework than married women when
the number of children is controlled for, but they work more in the market
and have less leisure.
Women who do live with their own parents, and to some extent, with
other relatives, do less housework. However, the unreported interacted specifi-
cation indicates that there is no significant difference in hours for these women
before they have their child. It must be kept in mind that some women move
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into their parents’ house shortly before or after giving birth, so that the group
of women living with their parents after birth may be different from the group
living with their parents before becoming pregnant.
The presence of an additional woman older than 18 decreases weekly
housework hours by about an hour and a half a week. The presence of addi-
tional women 12-18 has little effect on housework hours when the number of
previous children are accounted for. The reduction in housework associated
with having additional women in the household is more than made up by in-
creased average market work hours. Women with other women over 18 years
old in the household work 2.7-3.7 hours more in the market before birth, and
about an hour more after birth.
2.6.2 Men’s Time Use Response
The regressions of men’s average hours, which are reported in Table 2.8,
support the previous evidence that the birth of a child has little impact on
fathers’ time use, but indicate that men do help out for an additional second
child. Men’s housework, market work, and leisure are unaffected by the birth
of a singleton. However, men increase housework by 1.2 hours after the birth
of a twin.
Men with less education contribute less housework and work more in
the market, suggesting a backward-bending labor supply for market work.
There is no special effect of education to the care of a child.
Other aspects of family composition are also not very relevant. Other
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individuals in the household reduce men’s housework, and having more older
women or adult men in the household is associated with reduced work hours
and increased leisure. Men who are living with their own parents do both
less housework and less market work, perhaps because men without jobs or
who work few hours are less likely to be able to afford their own home. Each
additional previous child in the family reduces men’s housework by only about
14 minutes a week. However, the extra time is not devoted to market work,
but to leisure — 10 extra minutes a week.
2.6.3 Interpreting Results
The twins experiment provides an estimate of the time cost of a child
that is exogenous to decisions about time use in the home. However, it is not
the estimate that is of most interest, the expected time cost of a single new-
born regardless of the age of siblings. There are several important differences
between a twin and a singleton birth. The twin has a sibling of the same age,
while the singleton cannot have siblings less than 15 months older, and may
have no older siblings. Moreover, the twin, although unplanned, was born at a
time when the parents were likely to have had particularly low costs to home
production .
How does the twins estimate of the cost of a child compare with the cost
of a child born in a more common birth spacing, at some time a year of more
after her sibling? If there are economies of scale to taking care of children of
the same age and sex, the twins might take less time, and the marginal effect
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of the twin child could be interpreted as the lower bound for the effect of an
exogenous second young child. However, because older children take less care,
the combination of the infant and 1 year old might take less time, in which
case the marginal effect of the twin would be a higher than the estimate of an
exogenous non-twin birth.
Even if the coefficient on twins is taken as the lower bound of the effect
of an unplanned child to a mother who already had a small child, the estimates
seem rather low compared to previous estimates. The marginal effect of a twin,
3.5 hours a week, is far below the estimates of 12 hours or more that some
researchers have found, or what many people might intuitively guess. Even
the OLS coefficient on a single birth, 4.6 hours a week, is lower than estimates
from other studies. Some of the difference has to do with the way housework
is measured. Because the question asks about aggregate housework, rather
than child care and housework individually, joint activities are not double-
counted. A large amount of substitution between housework activities could
mean that child care took much more than the estimated amount, but that
time spent in other housekeeping tasks went down as well. This in itself is
an interesting question. If the quality of other home production is decreased,
this is another aspect of the cost of the child. Particularly, it is important to
know if additional children take time away from child care provided to previous
siblings.
It is also worth noting that total hours worked in the home is only one
dimension of the effect having a child may have on work participation and
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hours. Other researchers have hypothesized that caring for children may be
more effort-intensive than other types of work. The scheduling of child-care
is important in addition to total hours. Young children demand attention at
inflexible periods and also on an unpredictable schedule. This can make any
work which must be scheduled even a few hours in advance difficult .
2.7 Concerns with Recall Data
Recall data are less accurate than time diary data. Juster and Stafford
(1991) discuss this problem in detail in their review of time-use data. In tests,
estimates from recall data were 25% higher for household chores and 3 times
higher for child care, compared to time-diary estimates. This could be because
child care is especially effort-intensive and thus people remember doing it more,
or because child care is likely to be a joint activity. This problem is mitigated
by the fact that I use total hours of housework, not the hours for a specific
activity, so I do not have a problem with over-reporting due to counting joint
activities twice. If additional housework hours are systematically over-reported
by some set percent, the level estimates will be biased up, but the percent
change in housework will not be. However, if child care is systematically over-
reported and other housework is not, and time is substituted form housework
to child care, the estimates in the change will be biased.
A related problem is that people tend to estimate both housework and
work hours with approximations. This will increase standard errors, but will
not change the expected value of the estimated effects unless there is systematic
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under- or over-reporting.
Many observations are reported by other members of the household. If
these data are reported with error, it will lead to unreliable standard errors.
Worse, if they are systematically underreported, the level estimates will be
biased downward. This is more of a problem for working women and for men7.
As a comparison, I also ran regressions using only those observations for which
data have been supplied by the women herself for nonworking women. The
average hours of housework are higher for those who are report their own hours
(as expected). However, compared to all nonworking women, the coefficient
on Twin is only slightly higher. If women underestimate the additional hours
that men contribute to housework when a child is born, this could lead to an
underestimate of the hours of men.
2.8 Conclusions
This study has used the birth of twins as a natural experiment to
measure the effect of a marginal child on household time use. This is the
first research to address the effect of a child on housework hours accounting
for the endogeneity of children. The estimate for women’s time use of 3.5
hours may be interpreted as the lower bound on the expected increase in
household hours for a woman who already has a small child and unexpectedly
7Among nonworking women in my sample, 68.4% of observations are self-reported, while
among women who work the figure is 56.5%. The figures for self-reporting are 20.3%-33.5%
for men.
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has another. Accepting this as a lower-bound estimate, however, requires
making assumptions about the direction of the bias and the economies of scale
of small children.
Overall, the effect of an additional child is relatively small - the twins
estimate is a 8.3% increase over hours worked in the home before pregnancy.
Even the OLS estimates are relatively small, showing about a 13% increase
in women’s housework hours. A new child generates a smaller reduction on
women’s work than the increase in her housework, and a negative effect on
women’s leisure. I find no overall effect of children on men’s work and leisure,
although there is an increase of 1.1 hours a week for housework hours in re-
sponse to the birth of twins.
The size of these estimates might indicate that families are flexible with
how they use their time in the house, and that, while women’s leisure time
is reduced by the birth of a child, additional housework hours may not be
the main impact of children on women’s welfare and labor supply decisions.
Other aspects, such as the need to be “on-call” for children at all times, a
higher intensity of effort, or scheduling problems in combining child care with




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2: Variable Means by Twin Status
Women Men
Nontwin Twin Nontwin Twin
Ind. Obs. 47,847 390 42,556 347
Total Obs. 156,427 1,310 137,436 1,159
Variable
Age 26.62 28.35 29.66 31.31
(5.84) (5.80) (6.88) (6.80)
Education 7.87 7.86 8.79 8.68
(3.18) (3.17) (3.25) (3.44)
Married 0.77 0.80 0.86 0.87
(0.42) (0.40) (0.35) (0.33)
Single 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00
(0.26) (0.20) (0.03) (0.04)
Divorced 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00
(0.17) (0.21) (0.01) (0.03)
Common-Law 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.12
(0.33) (0.32) (0.35) (0.33)
Father’s Fam. 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05
(0.28) (0.25) (0.24) (0.22)
Mother’s Fam. 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.07
(0.34) (0.30) (0.29) (0.26)
Other Rel. 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11)
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Table 2.3: Variable Means by Twin Status
Variable Nontwin HH Twin HH
No. Births 2.08 3.16
(1.49) (1.96)
No. Prev. Children 1.20 1.47
(1.31) (1.53)
Has Spouse 0.88 0.88
(0.33) (0.32)
Other Women 12-18 0.15 0.19
(0.44) (0.50)
Other Women 19-59 0.28 0.20
(0.63) (0.55)
Other Women>59 0.13 0.07
(0.35) (0.27)
Other Men 12-18 0.15 0.18
(0.44) (0.50)
Other Men 19-59 0.24 0.18
(0.60) (0.53)
Other Men>59 0.10 0.07
(0.31) (0.27)
Own Income* 153.51 152.19
(356.22) (329.81)
Spouse Income* 618.69 674.18
(766.65) (789.30)
HH Income* 852.21 855.42
(1077.22) (905.10)
*Monthly income in 1990 pesos
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Table 2.4: Variable Means by Birth Period, Women
Prepregnancy Pregnancy After Birth
All All Nontwin Twin
No. Ind. 2,359 14,549 47,847 390
No. Obs. 2,359 28,835 125,528 1,017
Housework, Hrs/Wk. 38.00 38.59 42.87 46.42
(17.21) (16.52) (17.20) (18.66)
Work Hrs./Wk. 13.73 10.59 9.64 7.93
(20.20) (18.53) (18.01) (16.64)
Work Hrs (Workers) 37.56 37.49 37.11 37.01
(14.85) (14.38) (15.13) (14.64)
Leisure Hrs/Wk. 153.91 157.11 158.08 159.84
(20.59) (18.90) (18.37) (16.98)
Total Hrs/Wk. 51.72 49.18 52.50 54.35
(19.58) (18.65) (18.30) (18.79)
HH Housework Hrs/Wk. 61.98 62.86 67.47 67.86
(34.79) (35.62) (36.80) (35.72)
Employed 0.37 0.30 0.28 0.23
(0.48) (0.46) (0.45) (0.42)
Pos. Work Hrs 0.37 0.28 0.26 0.21
(0.48) (0.45) (0.44) (0.41)
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Table 2.5: Variable Means by Birth Period, Spouses
Prepregnancy Pregnancy After Birth
All Spouses All Spouses Nontwin Twin
No. Ind. 2,029 12,822 42,556 347
No. Obs. 2,029 25,137 110,515 904
Housework, Hrs/Wk. 6.53 6.22 6.69 7.30
(8.51) (8.10) (8.59) (8.98)
Work, Hrs./Wk. 45.81 45.67 45.72 44.45
(17.95) (18.11) (18.23) (17.60)
Work Hrs (Workers) 49.08 48.88 49.03 48.12
(13.60) (13.93) (13.93) (12.59)
Leisure, Hrs/Wk. 121.22 121.37 121.32 122.59
(18.04) (18.19) (18.32) (17.70)
Total Hours/Wk. 52.34 51.89 52.41 51.76
(18.65) (18.89) (19.13) (19.18)
HH Housework, Hrs/Wk. 59.40 60.53 65.44 69.05
(33.07) (34.13) (35.23) (35.52)
Employed 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20)
Positive Work Hrs 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.92






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8: Women’s Hours by Number of Previous Children
Women’s Housework
No Prev. One Prev. Two Prev.
Singleton 9.175 (0.551)*** 4.911 (0.537)*** 2.469 (0.668)***
Twin 12.578 (1.321)*** 7.461 (1.164)*** 6.382 (1.730)***
None/Elem. 2.198 (0.242)*** 3.495 (0.272)*** 4.14 (0.366)***
Jr. High 2.454 (0.249)*** 3.463 (0.284)*** 4.472 (0.391)***
College -3.113 (0.454)*** -0.254 (0.572) 0.095 (0.881)
Women’s Market Work
No Prev. One Prev. Two Prev.
Singleton -5.222 (0.837)*** -4.444 (0.670)*** -4.397 (0.802)***
Twin -8.259 (1.700)*** -5.164 (1.518)*** -6.7 (1.513)***
None/Elem. -1.866 (0.329)*** -3.437 (0.351)*** -3.689 (0.470)***
Jr. High -1.712 (0.336)*** -3.681 (0.370)*** -4.098 (0.503)***
College -2.541 (0.565)*** -0.052 -0.718 0.202 -1.049
Men’s Housework
No Prev. One Prev. Two Prev.
Singleton 1.242 (0.333)*** -0.01 -0.302 -0.347 -0.386
Twin 1.774 (0.727)** 0.178 -0.555 2.145 (0.862)**
None/Elem. -0.524 (0.125)*** -0.572 (0.128)*** -0.118 (0.159)
Jr. High -0.26 (0.117)** -0.417 (0.125)*** -0.061 (0.163)
College 0.318 (0.206) 0.106 (0.214) 0.216 (0.266)
Men’s Market Work
No Prev. One Prev. Two Prev.
Singleton -1.045 -0.778 0.704 -0.673 0.88 -0.810
Twin -2.854 (1.632)* 0.246 (1.220) -0.977 (1.804)
None/Elem. 1.349 (0.327)*** -0.243 (0.319) -0.14 (0.411)
Jr. High 1.95 (0.300)*** 1.05 (0.305)*** 1.041 (0.430)**















































































































































Helping the Family Immigrant English Skills
and Self-Employment
3.1 Introduction
Self-employment has been seen in the American national mythos as a
means for hard-working immigrants to pull themselves up in spite of disad-
vantage. Popular culture contains many fond references to immigrant-owned
small business, from Apu in The Simpsons to Seinfeld’s Soup Nazi. In fact,
immigrants from Europe and Asia do have higher rates of self-employment
than native-born Americans, although the difference has narrowed in recent
decades. The rates are particularly high when compared to nonimmigrant
groups that might be considered disadvantaged in similar ways.
Sociologists and, to a lesser extent, economists have advanced many
theories to explain immigrants’ higher self-employment rates. One branch
of the literature hypothesizes that immigrants have a special advantage in
self-employment, such as better entrepreneurial skills or a preference for self-
employment (Light (2000), Yuengert (1989)), a comparative advantage in serv-
ing niche markets (Borjas (1986), Aldrich and Waldinger (1990)), or access to
credit and information through social networks (Light (2000), Aldrich and
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Waldinger (1990). An overview of these theories is found in Fairlie and Meyer
(1994). Alternatively, immigrants might have some disadvantage in wage em-
ployment that they do not have in self-employment. Glazer and Moynihan
(1970) suggest that self-employment is a means of social advancement for
groups facing discrimination. Immigrants have less education on average and
are less familiar with the system and culture. They may face discrimina-
tion (Bronars and Borjas (1989)) or have difficulties with their legal standing.
The difficulty is in identifying factors which have differential returns in wage
labor than in self-employment. Social networks provide opportunities for self-
employment, but also for wage employment, and often arise to address an
underlying disadvantage. The disadvantages faced by immigrants would also
seem to hurt them in self-employment. It is not clear ex-ante why these factors
would encourage self-employment.
Another disadvantage for many immigrants in the U.S. is a poor set
of English skills. Workers who speak English poorly cannot communicate
clearly with supervisors and customers. This reduces their productivity, and
hurts them in negotiating for higher salary or better benefits. They may
be less informed about new opportunities, employee services, and workers’
rights. However, poor language skills also pose problems in self-employment.
Since most immigrant businesses serve primarily clients outside of their owners’
ethnic groups, communication in English is important. In addition to dealing
with customers and clients, someone who is self-employed must also be able
to deal with bureaucratic red-tape and negotiate for credit and contracts.
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An immigrant with poor language skills would be better off if she could
enter a partnership with someone who spoke both her own language and En-
glish. The poor speaker could then specialize in tasks not requiring language
skills, letting the better speaker handle aspects of the job requiring commu-
nication in English. Unlike wage employment, which creates jobs and then
seeks workers to fit them, two workers who organize their own business can
tailor tasks to suit the abilities of each. As long as the total business profit
is at least the same as total of the wages the workers would receive in wage
employment, some arrangement can be worked out so that the workers are
indifferent between the two choices.
The family unit provides a natural basis for the development of such
contracts. On the most basic level, it provides a pool of people who speak the
same language and know each other. The family has detailed information on
the abilities of its members that is unavailable to employers, which reduces
monitoring costs. It also has access to nonmonetary threats and incentives.
Trust may intrinsically be greater between family members than between em-
ployees and employers. Finally, if families are altruistic and share income, then
other family members have a direct interest in maximizing the total income of
the family, not just their own wages.
The motivation for this type of collaboration is the presence of the
opportunity for trade among family members in their language skills. If pro-
ductive family members can all do as well individually in the labor market
as they can together, there is no incentive for them to open a business. If
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everyone in the family is disadvantaged, there is no reason self-employment
income would be higher than wages for anyone. Thus, I expect to find that
the greater the dispersion of English skills in the household, the greater the
likelihood of self-employment.
The result of such a family-based collaboration could be a family busi-
ness. In this case, both good English speakers and poor English speakers
would be more likely to be self-employed if there was a spread of English skills
in the household. However, the arrangement could be more informal. House-
hold members who speak English well could provide advice to self-employed
relatives who speak English poorly. Those who speak English poorly could be
hired as employees or help out informally in a business operated by a family
member speaking English well. In this case, the range of English skills in the
family will still be important for the possibility that any one family member
is self-employed, but it might not increase the chances of self-employment for
family members of all language abilities.
Understanding how language skills influence immigrants’ labor deci-
sions might help develop policies to help them assimilate. Many local and
state governments see self-employment initiatives as a means to address un-
employment and poverty, and might want to increase self-employment among
immigrant groups. On the employment side, it makes sense to help small
businesses more if they are employing people who otherwise would be under-
employed or unemployed. Finally, understanding the family context of the
self-employment decision might provide some insight into how families inter-
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act and help each other, and indicate special vulnerabilities for individuals
who do not have such family support.
3.2 Background
The U.S. remains a country of immigrants. In March 2000, 28.4 million
Americans were foreign-born, or 10.4% of the population. Both the total num-
ber of immigrants and the percentage of immigrants has been increasing since
1970, and currently is at its highest level since the 1930’s. In all, immigrants
make up 12.4% of the U.S. labor force.
Self-employment has historically been an important source of work for
immigrants. From 1910 through the 1950’s, immigrant self-employment rose
slightly as native self-employment rates went down, reaching a high of 18.1%
in the 1940 Census and 17.6% in the 1950 Census (Chart 3.1). The self-
employment rate of native-born Americans in the same two Censuses was
12.6% and 11.4%, respectively. In recent decades the level of immigrant self-
employment has been closer to that of natives. Immigrant self-employment
dropped sharply in the 1960 and 1970 Censuses. After 1980, both immigrant
and native self-employment grew slightly, ranging from 8–10%. In 2000, the
self-employment rate is only slightly higher for immigrants.
Some of the decrease in immigrant self-employment is probably due to
changes in demographic composition. Immigrants to the U.S. in the 1930’s,
40’s and 50’s came primarily from Europe and were highly educated. In the
last three decades, immigrants from Mexico and Central America, who tend to
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have less education and less experience in the U.S. and may plan on returning
to their home countries, have far outnumbered immigrants from other regions.
As Chart 3.1 shows, self-employment for Mexican and Central immigrants to
the U.S. is lower than self-employment for other immigrant groups, and lower
than the self-employment of native-born Americans. When Central Americans
are excluded from the sample, the group of all other immigrants are about 2.2%
more likely to be self-employed than American natives. Some groups have
much higher self-employment rates. Workers 25-60 years old born in Korea
have a self-employment rate of 25.5%, those from the Middle East 21.5%, from
Greece 25%, and from Israel/Palestine 24.8% (Table 3.1).
3.2.1 Immigrant English Skills and Employment
Both immigrant self-employment and the effect of English skills on im-
migrant wages have been extensively studied on their own. There is wide
agreement that individual English skills are important to immigrants’ eco-
nomic outcomes. Carliner (1996) finds that the wage effect of improving one’s
English from one level to another on a scale of five in the U.S. Census (for
example, moving from speaking no English to speaking poor English or from
speaking English well to speaking English very well) is the same as the return
to an additional year of education. Chiswick and Miller (2002) find that fluent
English has a return of 14% for immigrants, controlling for selection of those
with more ability. The negative effect of speaking English poorly is highest for
those with more education in both studies. Berman and Lang (2003) find that
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improvements in Hebrew skills can explain 67-75% of the increase in wages
for skilled Russian-speaking workers in Israel. Others have found that immi-
grants to the UK who speak English more fluently select into higher-paying
occupations (Price and Shields (2002)), that immigrants who speak the preva-
lent language poorly have lower wages (Price and Shields (2002), Dustman and
Fabbri (2000)), and that immigrants who speak the dominant language poorly
tend to be concentrate in immigrant enclaves where there are lower returns to
English (McManus (1990)). Moreover, it is generally found that immigrants
with poor language skills are more likely to be unemployed and more likely
not to participate in the labor market (Chiswick and Miller (2002), Dustman
and Fabbri (2000)).
Less work has been done on the effect of English skills on self-employment.
Lofstrom (2002), in a study of assimilation and self-employment, includes
speaking no or poor English as a control variable in his regressions, and obtains
a negative coefficient. No studies have looked at the language skills of others
in the household, whether in relation to self-employment or other outcomes.
However, much work has been done on the importance of immigrant
enclaves, which may be relevant. An enclave, like a family, is a social network,
although on a much larger scale. In the literature, enclaves are usually defined
by ethnicity, Evans (1989) uses a linguistic basis for defining the enclave. The
expected effect of an enclave on self-employment probabilities is not clear.
Some researchers have hypothesized that larger enclaves offer larger specialized
markets which immigrant entrepreneurs can take advantage of (Borjas (1986),
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Aldrich and Waldinger (1990)). Immigrant entrepreneurs also have special
access to low-priced immigrant labor in an enclave. Reduced employer and
customer discrimination may also make it easier to enter self-employment.
However, if it is also easier to find a job in an enclave, then self-employment
may be lower. It is also difficult to predict which effect differential access
to credit in enclaves should have on self-employment. On the one hand, the
presence of many co-ethnics may make credit easier to obtain; on the other,
there are likely to be fewer formal banks and a lower average income level in
an immigrant enclave.
Not surprisingly, the empirical results are mixed and location-specific.
Borjas (1986) finds that Hispanics in Census SMSA groups with a higher
percentage of Hispanics are more likely to be self-employed. Le (2000) finds
positive effects of enclaves on self-employment among immigrants in Australia.
McManus (1989) finds that poor speakers have more jobs requiring communi-
cation skills and higher earnings the bigger the percent of co-ethnics in their
county. Clark and Drinkwater (2002) find that individuals in the UK are most
likely to be self-employed when they live in a region with the fewest coethnics,
and that there is little evidence that ethnic minority self-employment is related
to language-specific trading groups in enclaves.
Evans (1989) creates a language-based variable of group size using Aus-
tralian data to test the hypothesis that immigrant enclaves form an isolated
labor pool. Although her primary interest was cultural elements, she finds that
immigrants belonging to an ethnic group with a large percentage of individuals
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with no or poor English skills are more likely to be self-employed compared to
groups with complete English proficiency. She also finds that immigrants in
a large ethnic group are more likely to be self-employed than immigrants in a
small ethnic group.
3.2.2 The Role of the Family and Self-Employment
Few researchers have explicitly examined family models of self-employment
decision-making. Baker and Benjamin (1997) present Canadian evidence that
the labor supply decisions are jointly taken by immigrant husbands and wives,
with wives subsidizing husbands’ human capital accumulation. Blau et al
(2003) do a similar analysis using U.S. Census data and do not find this result
in the U.S..
However, there is substantial evidence that family plays a large role in
the self-employment decision. Family members may provide technical assis-
tance or access to credit, which have been shown to increase the possibility
of self-employment (Dunn and Hotz-Eakin (2000), Blanchflower and Oswald
(1997)). Other family members can provide a steady wage or other benefits,
such as insurance, which mitigate the risk of self-employment. The role of
a spouse in reducing risk is discussed in Borjas (1996). The role of spousal
insurance is discussed in Lombard (2001) and Velamuri (2004).
In addition, the spouses and children of the self-employed are sub-
stantially more likely to be self-employed themselves. Families may have
similar preferences for risk and independence, and workers who are already
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self-employed can provide technical assistance and information to other fam-
ily members. Blanchflower and Oswald (1997) show that fathers in more
management-oriented jobs have children who are more likely to be self-employed,
and Dunn and Hotz-Eakin (2000) show that children follow after their parents
in profession.
Self-employed workers may also prefer to have other family members
as employees. The business founder has more information about the skills and
effort of family members than about outsiders. Since other family members
have a direct stake in the success of the business, they are less likely to shirk.
Thus, hiring family members may impose fewer search and monitoring costs
than hiring outsiders. Additionally, people may prefer to work around people
like themselves. Finally, a family business may be able to absorb the work
of family members who want to work a small number of hours or are not
employable on the market for the minimum wage. Other household members,
for their part, may be able to provide a flexible source of temporary additional
labor at peak times.
The family is likely to be even more important for immigrants, who have
less access to formal sources of credit and information and greater difficulties
finding a job on the market. The family provides a nearby network of people
who are better known and can provide assistance to each other. The family’s
economic role in providing insurance and credit is greater for many immigrants
from countries with poorly developed markets. In addition, immigrant families
observed in the U.S. are a selected sample of families that may be especially
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tightly-knit and inclined to help family members.
Although there is no model of a family business in which self-employment
allows family members to capitalize on differences in there talents or abilities,
Bosman et al (2000) incorporate a similar concept in a paper examining the
return to the beauty capital of Dutch firms. In addition to the positive effect
of average worker beauty on firm productivity, they find that firms with a
greater dispersion of worker beauty have higher productivity. The argument
is that workers in such firms can specialize, and that specialization pays off.
3.2.3 English Skills of Immigrants
Most working immigrants in the U.S. speak English well or very well,
as shown in Chart 3.3. A sizeable group speaks only English. English skills
depend on age of entry, education, and years in the U.S.. Only 3% of college-
educated immigrants speak no or poor English compared to 57% of immigrants
with less than a high school education. Some 7% of all immigrants in the
sample speak no English, compared to 19% of immigrants who entered the
U.S. after the age of 45.
The distribution of English skills varies by region of origin. Mexico and
Central America provide the highest number of immigrants with no or poor
English. A large number of South Americans and East Asians also speak poor
English. For Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and Africa,
most people speak English very well or as a sole language. Central Americans
and Southeast Asian households are most likely to have a mixed composition
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of English skills in the household. Some 28% of Central American households
and 20.4% of East Asian households have both at least one non-speaker or
poor speaker and at least one very good speaker or monolingual speaker.
3.3 Model
In models of the self-employment of individuals, an individual will be
self-employed if the utility gained from self-employment is greater than that
of utility from wage employment, or U(SE) > U(WAGE). The direction
of this inequality depends on the relative return between market and self-
employment to basic human capital characteristics such as education, ex-
perience, entrepreneurial talent, and language skills. Decisions about self-
employment also depend on individual preferences and attitudes towards risk
and independence and on factors that influence the feasibility of entering self-
employment, such as the availability of credit or access to information. There
may also be constraints to entering wage or self-employment, such as discrim-
ination or lack of documentation.
For my model, I take two workers whose choice of self-employment or
wage employment depends only on the relative wage. I assume wages in both
types of work are equal to the marginal product of labor, and depend on the
workers’ human capital HK and their language skills. Adequate communica-
tion skills are important to realize the worker’s full productive capacity. Thus,
wage = MPL = F (θ, HK) where θ is an index between 0 and 1 representing
the degree of communication. If θ = 1, there is no communication problem
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and the wage depends only on HK. However, if employers and the employee
or employees and clients communicate imperfectly, the wage is some fraction
of what it would be if everyone spoke a common language. In a simple formu-
lation, we could imagine a job in which wage= θ ∗MPHK.
The two workers speak a common language besides English and each
has the same productivity in an environment where this language is spoken.
However, Worker A does not speak English fluently. The wages in both wage
employment and self-employment if both workers seek work independently are
thus wA = θw and wB = w.
If the two workers work together, they can tailor jobs to maximize total
earnings. An example would be an arrangement where the worker who speaks
English well works at the counter, and the worker who speaks English poorly
works in the stock room. Worker A will accept any self-employment wage
such that wseA > θw, and Worker B will accept any self-employment wage
such that wSEB > w. If collaboration implies that both workers reach their
full potential wage, the additional income from tailoring jobs is (1− θ)w. The
workers can bargain over how to split this increase, but either worker who
controlled total company income would be willing to give the other up to this
amount over her market wage to induce her to join the business. Even if self-
employment is less productive or more costly for one or both of the partners
individually, it may be beneficial if they cooperate.
If neither speaks fluent English, the wage of Worker A is θAw and
the wage of Worker B is θBw, with θB > θA. If collaboration means that the
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productivity of the worse speaker is increased to the productivity of the second,
the total wage gain is (θB−θA)w . The maximum gain to collaboration occurs
when the language abilities are as different as possible, or when θA = 0 and
θB = 1.
The dynamic in a family is similar. Total family income is equal to
Σθiw if all workers work separately, and n ∗ max(θiw) if they collaborate.
This model does not require altruism in the household. It assumes the same
returns to English skills in self- and wage-employment, but this assumption is
not needed. It may be that there is a greater disadvantage to poor English
skills in wage work, which supports the finding that poor and good speakers are
more likely to be self-employed. What is important is that there is a positive
return to English skills in both wage and self-employment, which is supported
by the literature. Cooperation reduces the penalty to having poor English
skills, so that individuals who may have chosen wage employment before now
have an incentive to enter self-employment.
3.4 Methodology and Data
3.4.1 Model Specification
To test the effect of language skills on the likelihood an individual is
self-employed, I use a probit specification as follows:
Pr(SE) = Φ(X ′β + Z ′γ + C ′δ + ε)
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Where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function, X is a vector
of personal characteristics, Z is a vector of household variables, and C is a
vector of community characteristics.
In addition to the usual labor supply variables , the vector X contains
indicator variables for own English level. The vector of household variables
contains variables specifying the number of workers who speak English at each
level (No English, Poor English, Good English, and Only English). Since the
number of workers in the household is also controlled for, the number of very
good speakers is omitted. Household variables also include the average level of
education, years in the U.S., and age among workers in the household. Finally,
a measure of the range of English skills among foreign-language speakers in
the household is included. This variable is defined as ,
Range = max(ENG|notOnlyEnglish)−min(ENG|notOnlyEnglish)
where ENG is a discrete measure of individual English skills valued
from 1-5 for the categories listed above. Range is a discrete variable with
values between 0-3. Only English speakers are not included in the calculation
since they are less able to translate. However, alternate specifications which
included only English speakers in the calculation of Range produced similar
results. For households with only “only English” speakers, the value of Range
is set at 0.
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subsectionData The data are the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Integrated Pub-
lic Use Microsamples (IPUMS) of the U.S. Census. The Census provides in-
formation on place of birth and citizenship status, allowing me to identify
immigrants. Since 1980, the Census has asked respondents to rate their own
language abilities according to five categories: does not speak English, speaks
English but not well, speaks English well, speaks English very well, and speaks
only English. I use these to construct indicator variables for individual and
household language skills.
I extract foreign-born persons between the ages of 25 and 60 who en-
tered the U.S. after the age of 15 and who are currently working. The age
restrictions are to avoid confusing decisions about self-employment and deci-
sions about education and retirement. Unpaid work for a family member or
relative is categorized as self-employment . I exclude immigrants from Puerto
Rico or U.S. protectorates and U.S. citizens born abroad. Finally, since my
analysis relies on the English skills of others working in the family, I exclude
households with only one earner from the data set. This removes 27% of the
otherwise eligible immigrant households. Alternate regressions on all house-
holds produced similar results.
All of the household language variables and household characteristics
are based on the language skills of other members of the family who are cur-
rently employed. This might create some selection problem, since language
skills also influence who is in the labor force and who is employed. How-
ever, alternate regressions using variables based on all family members 16-60
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and all household members 12 and older produce similar results, although the
magnitude of coefficients is weaker.
3.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics for the entire sample. The
sample contains observations on 651,215 male and female immigrants from
423,138 households with two or more earners. A substantial percent of im-
migrants speak English poorly. A full 32% of the immigrants were born in
Mexico/Central America. The percent of the sample self-employed is 12%.
Table 3.3 presents statistics on the distribution of the range of En-
glish skills in the household. Most immigrant households have no variation in
English skills - 60% have only members with the same English skills or com-
binations of one level of English and monolingual English. A little more than
25% have a one-step difference in English skills, i.e. a good speaker and a very
good speaker. Some 12% have a two-step difference. Finally, only 3.1% have
a three-step level of difference. The range in English skills varies by household
size and own English skills. Two-earner households have an average range of
only .35 steps, while households with four or more earners have an average
difference of 1.2 steps. Some 78% of very good speakers live in households
where other workers speak English very well or as an only language, and only
1.8% have a nonspeaker in the household who is working. In contrast, 19.7%
of nonspeakers are in households where another worker speaks English very
well.
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Separate means by region are not reported. However, given that they
have the most dispersion of language skills overall and the largest family sizes,
it is not surprising that immigrants from Mexico and Central America have the
highest dispersion of language skills, followed by South Americans. The aver-
age for Mexicans and Central Americans for Range is .95, compared with an
overall average of .59 in all households. Immigrants from the main Common-
wealth counties (the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand)
have almost no variation in worker English skills.
3.5.1 Individual English Skills and Self-Employment
The Census results show a concave relationship between English skills
and self-employment in the entire sample. However, the association between
mean English skills and self-employment rates varies by gender and region
and has changed over time. Table 3.4 shows the means of self-employment
aggregated, for all years, and by gender for immigrant workers aged 25-60.
Good speakers have the highest self-employment rate overall, followed closely
by very good speakers. Not controlling for any other factors, non-English
speakers in the sample are about 58% as likely to be self-employed as those
who have good English: 6.2% of working immigrant nonspeakers in the target
group are self-employed, compared to 12.9% of good speakers and 12.4% of
very good speakers.
The association between language skills and self-employment has changed
over time in ways that are different for men and women. In the 1980 Cen-
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sus, non-English-speaking men in the target group had a self-employment rate
of only 3.3%, while 15.5% of very good speakers were self-employed. The
self-employment rates for women were lower than those of men in almost ev-
ery category, with nonspeakers having a self-employment rate of only 2.8%.
Over time, the self-employment rates of men have fallen for good speakers
and risen slightly for poor and non-speakers. For women, on the other hand,
self-employment has gone up in all categories, but especially for non- and poor
speakers. While the self-employment rates of women who speak English well or
better remains below that of men in similar categories, at the two lower English
levels women’s self-employment is higher. While women’s self-employment in
the general population has also gone up, the increase has mostly been for more
educated women (Devine, (1994)).
Of course, English skills are correlated with a wide range of other char-
acteristics that influence self-employment. In addition to the effect of language
skills, these means capture the influence of education, own ability, experience
in the U.S., commitment to the U.S. labor market, and degree of assimila-
tion, among other things. Table 3.5 reports regressions of self-employment
on individual characteristics for working immigrants 25-60 overall controlling
for some of these factors. The first three columns report only the variables
specified, while the fourth column represents a full specification which controls
for all relevant personal characteristics, region of birth, and state of residence,
but not household English skills. The omitted language category is “Speaks
English Very Well”. Overall, over 75% of the lower self-employment of poor
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speakers is explained by lower education and fewer years in the U.S.. Among
workers of a given educational level, those who speak English poorly or well are
more likely to be self-employed. Self-employment rates also vary substantially
by region of birth.
When the full range of characteristics is controlled for, including region
of birth and state of residence, non-English speakers are about as likely as
very good speakers to be self-employed, and good and poor speakers are more
likely to be self-employed by about the same margin. Western Europe and
Southeast Asia are the only regional divisions whose emigrants who are good
speakers do not have significantly higher self-employment once other factors
are controlled for than very good speakers. Own English skills are jointly
significant, however, for all regions except the UK, Canada, and Australia and
Africa - areas where the overwhelming majority of immigrants speak English
very well or as a sole reported language.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Effect of Range of Household English Skills on Individual
Self-Employment
Much evidence points to separate determinants of self-employment for
women. Therefore, I run regressions on men and women separately. Results
are reported in Table 3.7.
Once the characteristics of other household members are taken into
account, poor English skills are slightly less of a deterrent to self-employment.
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While non-English speakers are less likely to be self-employed than very good
speakers (the omitted category), both poor and good speakers are more likely
to be self-employed. Those who speak only English are slightly less likely to
be self-employed. For women in particular, poorer English skills are associated
with higher self-employment, once education and experience are controlled for.
As expected, having additional nonspeakers and “Only English” speakers in
the household reduces the individual’s likelihood of being in self-employment,
since these are the groups less likely to be individually self-employed.
Household range of English skills has a significant positive effect on
individuals’ self-employment. There is a .3 percentage point increase in the
probability of self-employment for each increase in the Range variable over
the entire sample. This is only slightly less than the effect of an additional
year of education or experience in the U.S.. This implies that, controlling for
the number of workers in each of the language categories and their average
education, age, and experience in the U.S., someone with good English skills
who had either a poor or very good speaker would be 3.2% percent more likely
to be self-employed than someone with another speaker who had the same
language skills, taking the predicted self-employment rate at mean values of
10.36%.
The measurement for Range was significant for men in all specifica-
tions, while for women it was significant only for three-earner households
when separate regressions were run by number of workers in the household
(not reported). For men, the coefficient on Range is .003 overall, representing
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an increase of 3.1% increase over predicted mean self-employment for each
increase in Range. For men in three-earner families, the coefficient of .005 im-
plies a percent increase of 4.63% over predicted self-employment at the sample
means and 3.83% over the actual average mean.
The signs of the other coefficients are mostly as expected, although the
effects of many key variables vary by gender. Women are less likely to be self-
employed, and this difference is more pronounced for those with higher English
levels. Age, education, and years in the U.S. are associated with an almost
linear increase in self-employment. Children under 5 significantly increase the
probability of women’s self-employment, in line with previous research that
self-employment reflects a demand for greater flexibility for women. Average
education, age, and experience in the U.S. of other workers in the household
has very little association with higher self-employment once other factors are
controlled for, although the effect of household education is more important
for women.
3.6.2 The Effect of Household Language Skills by Own English
Skills
Since my hypothesis is that having others with different language skills
affects self-employment, the variables that are of interest to the model are
the effects of other speakers on individuals with different language skills. If
the model is correct, then the effect of the English skills of others in the
household will vary by own English skills. Individuals with poor English skills
70
will have a higher probability of entering self-employment if there is someone
in the household who speaks English well. Those with good skills will have
a higher probability of entering self-employment if there is another household
member with poor English skills. Both poor and good speakers will have
increased probabilities of self-employment in the context of a family with a
mix of English skills.
Having others in the family with different skills does result in a higher
self-employment probability, as seen in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. Having an ad-
ditional non-English-speaking worker in the family, instead of a very good
speaker, significantly reduces self-employment for non-English-speakers and
poor speakers (taken together) in every specification. They have a negative ef-
fect in most specifications on the self-employment probabilities of good speak-
ers, but the effect is not significant most of the time. On the other hand, having
an additional non-English-speaker instead of a very good speaker increases the
self-employment probability of very good speakers. A man who speaks English
very well is 1.5 percentage points more likely to be self-employed if an addi-
tional non-English-speaker is added to the household, while a woman is 1.1
percentage points more likely to be self-employed. The same pattern holds for
poor speakers. Having an additional good speaker has a slight negative effect
for non/poor speakers and a positive effect for very good speakers. Additional
English-only speakers have a negative effect on all groups. The results support
the model, and are stronger for men.
English-only speakers are the only group for whom, in separate regres-
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sions, the null hypothesis that the language skills of others in the household
have no effect on the probability of self-employment cannot be rejected. It
would be tempting to say that this is because household language skills do
not play any role for monolingual English speakers: since they cannot speak
the other language, they might make poor translators. However, these are all
immigrants with only English skills, not native-born Americans who live with
immigrants. Immigrants who speak only English are much more likely to be
married to a nonimmigrant. They have almost no little variation in household
English skills. Some 87.8% live in households where no one speaks a language
other than English. Another 8.9% have a very good or good speaker in the
house, and only 2.6% a poor or nonspeaker. In addition, the sample size of
this group is smaller than for the other groups. The coefficients on the number
of other non- and poor speakers are positive and almost significant for non-
speakers, so it seems likely that a larger sample size might produce stronger
results.
Although not reported, the effects are largest for men in three-earner
households. Here, having a nonspeaker rather than another very good speaker
increases the self-employment likelihood by 3.6 percentage points on average
for very good speakers, while having another poor speaker increases the self-
employment probability by 2.1 percentage points. This represents a 30.5% and
17.8% increase over the predicted self-employment (11.82%) for this group.
However, this group is small.
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3.6.3 Household Language and Language Prevalence
Sociologists have long hypothesized that enclaves increase immigrant
self-employment through social networks which provide informal finance and
information. (Light (2000), Aldrich and Waldinger (1990)). Enclaves also may
provide a niche market that co-ethnics have an advantage in serving (Light
2000), and provide a source of cheap immigrant labor.
While the mechanism is not clear, there is some empirical evidence that
enclaves do increase immigrant self-employment. Most notably, Borjas (1986)
finds that Hispanic men who live in metropolitan areas with more Hispanics
have higher self-employment rates. The effect is stronger for immigrants, but
also significant and positive for native-born Mexican-Americans. He finds no
similar result for non-Hispanics, either immigrant or not. Without offering
an explanation for how this mechanism works, he suggests it may involve a
cultural or linguistic advantage of Hispanics in providing services to a Hispanic
population.
Could the results be reflecting the effect of immigrant enclaves, instead
of the family? Immigrants with poor English skills are more likely to live in
an enclave. It could be that families with a mix of English skills also tend to
be located in enclave areas. If immigrant self-employment is more common
in enclaves, as many studies have concluded, then the positive coefficients on
Range could be picking up the effect of living in an enclave rather than of
household language skills.
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I calculate a variable to capture the effect of immigrant enclaves by
measuring the percent of others in the metropolitan area who speak the same
language . This is a rough substitute for a true enclave, which would be much
smaller. Unfortunately, the IPUMS does not provide small Census units for
analysis - the smallest possible geographic unit available for analysis is the
PUMS and SUPERPUMS, which contain a minimum of 100,000 and 400,000
persons respectively, and these are not comparable across Census years.
Individuals who speak a foreign language from families with a greater
range of language skills do tend to live in metropolitan areas with a greater
prevalence of their native language. Workers in households with the maxi-
mum value of the Range (i.e., those that have both a non-English-speaker and
a very good or Only English speaker or a poor speaker and an Only English
speaker) live in metropolitan areas where 18% of the population speaks the
same language. However, among individuals with no variation in their house-
hold English skills, only 8% of others in their metropolitan region speak the
same language. (English only speakers are excluded from these means). Non-
speakers are the only group that is more likely to live in an area with lower
prevalence of their language if there is a higher range of English skills in their
own household. (Table not included).
The effect of language prevalence in this sample depends on the specifi-
cation used. When percent language prevalence is enter in a regression with the
full specification used earlier, there is a small positive effect on self-employment
for men and small negative effect for women. However, if a log specification is
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used, there is small negative effect. The distribution of language prevalence is
very skewed, with many observations tending towards zero.
Regressions including prevalence and log prevalence and the interaction
of these variable with Range do explain some of the effect of the range house-
hold English skills, as reported in Table 3.10. In the non log specification, the
coefficient of Range drops from .007 in the group of all men speaking foreign
languages and .005 in the group of all women speaking English to .002 and
.001 in the regression with women (here, prevalence is added as a percent,
so the effect of a one-percent increase in language prevalence is 1/100 of the
coefficient). However, there is still a positive coefficient on Range. These re-
gressions are only on persons who report a native language other than English.
There is a significant interaction term for the sample of all speakers for both
men and women in the log specification, indicating that a spread of English is
more important in areas with higher language prevalence. This is opposite to
what might be expected from the model, which would suggest that household
English skills would matter more in areas where there was a greater return
to English skills. However, the interaction term is not significant in other
specifications.
For men who speak no or poor English, there is no significant effect of
Range after controlling for log language prevalence. For men who speak good
or very good English, the effects of English Range are significant and positive.
Once language prevalence is controlled for, women who speak English very
well also have a significant positive effect of Range.
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The estimated effects of language prevalence on self-employment prob-
ability are not robust to changing specifications. There are many extreme
values of prevalence, with one group — Spanish speakers — having a much
higher average than every other language group. There are also quite a few
observations where language prevalence is close to zero. In the log specifica-
tion, log language prevalence has a negative effect on self-employment. When
entered as a level, language prevalence has a positive effect. Overall, account-
ing for language prevalence reduces the coefficient on Range slightly for the
pooled group.
3.6.4 Regional Differences
As Fairlie and Meyer (1994) emphasize, self-employment rates vary
among groups with different national origins. Immigrants from different areas
also have different linguistic and cultural resources available in the U.S.. It
seems plausible that the effect of language and household language skills also
varies by region.
Omitting the Commonwealth countries and Africa, which have high
rates of English-only speakers and small sample sizes, I use the specification
with log language prevalence from above on each region separately (Table
3.11). Range has a positive effect in all regions except the Middle East, where
it is insignificant. The effect is primarily for very good and good speakers.
Mexico is the only country which has a significant positive effect for non/poor
speakers. The effect is particularly strong for East Asia and Southeast Asia.
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For Mexico, at the mean levels of self-employment, an additional increment of
Range would lead to a 3.3% increase in self-employment for non/poor speakers
and a 7.9% increase for very good speakers; for East Asia, there is a negative
6.4% effect on non/poor speakers and a 14.7% increase for very good speakers,




The results broadly support the hypothesis that trade in English skills
within families encourages self-employment. However, there are a number of
alternative theories which would also explain my findings.
The positive effect of having a very good speaker on the self-employment
of poor speakers is not in itself surprising. Having a better speaker may
indicate that the family has more resources, which would encourage self-
employment on its own. If poor speakers have tighter credit constraints than
good speakers, this could explain the difference of the effect of poor speakers
compared to very good speakers. Information on savings is not available in the
Census. The inclusion of own English and average household education in the
regression should control for this effect. The fact the very good speakers on
their own are less likely in most cases to be self-employed also argues against
this effect.
Families with mixed English skills could also be families with a greater
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commitment to the U.S. labor market, shown by the immigration of more
of the family. Alternatively, these families could be exceptionally tight-knit,
which could affect their likelihood of having a family business. In this case, the
estimates would be biased up. Although there is no information on intentions
about staying in the U.S., controls for time already spent in the U.S. should
account for much of this effect.
Mixed English skills might indicate a less assimilated family. If self-
employment is a response to discrimination or there is some unexplained factor
about being more “foreign” that leads to self-employment, less assimilated
households might have more self-employment. If assimilation and Range are
correlated as well, this could introduce a spurious effect of Range on self-
employment. It is unclear what that relationship might be, and why, if it
existed, households with all poor speakers would not be more likely to be self-
employed. Moreover, language-prevalence should proxy for many of the effects
of non-assimilation.
Rather than tailoring jobs to suit the family, immigrants could actually
be tailoring the family to suit the job. This could be accomplished in the
household through marriage and fertility decisions and decisions about how
much language to invest in. Decisions are also made about who lives in the
household (instead of in their own home), which relatives to immigrate with,
and which order the family should come over in (all at once or over time).
Although this would be the inverse of the process in my model, it would
support the fundamental premise: families would be using self-employment as
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a collaboration which enabled them to maximize earnings in a more efficient
manner than if they had to seek employment separately.
Language skills themselves are not exogenously determined. Immi-
grants make decisions about whether to immigrate, where to immigrate to,
and who to immigrate with based in part on their human capital characteris-
tics, including English skills. Immigrants with different levels of English skills
before immigration likely have very different expectations of the type of jobs
they will look for when they reach the U.S.. Mexican immigrants who speak
English more poorly are more likely to live in areas with large numbers of other
Mexican immigrants, but it is not clear if this is because immigrants with poor
skills choose these areas or if immigrants who live around colinguals have less
incentive to learn English. Once in the U.S., decisions about how much to
invest in English depend on linguistic ability, work skills, and occupational
choices. It could be that families with a business have an incentive to invest in
language training only for some of their members, whereas members of fami-
lies where all family members are wage-employment have equal incentives to
invest in English (or not). While this would still show the active role of the
family in influencing decisions, it would represent a different mechanism than
the one presented in my model.
Finally, this work uses the household as the basis for analysis. The
household is an imperfect substitute for economic unit of true interest, the
family. The data set has no information on the influence of family members
living outside of the household or outside of the country. Therefore, the esti-
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mated effect will underestimate the true role of family.
A more difficult problem is that household composition may be endoge-
nous, in that household composition depends on preferences for family size and
housing arrangements. Extended families with more income may be able to
afford separate households, making a large family appear as small households
for wealthier families or families who value individual space more. If there is
no systematic reason to believe different mechanisms are at work for house-
holds who choose different housing arrangements, then this simply introduces
measurement error and will bias the coefficients toward zero, which would
strengthen the estimated effects. However, it is not clear how preferences for
household size are related to preferences for cooperation between household
members or household language skills.
There is also temporal problem. Individuals may choose self-employment
early in their careers, and then remain self-employed even though the house-
hold structure changes. The important variable may actually be family char-
acteristics at the time initial work decisions are made, not at the time of the
interview. If current household English is a poor proxy, it will bias the coeffi-
cients toward zero and the actual effect might be greater. Including years in
the U.S. and own age partially control for this effect.
3.7.2 Selection Issues
There are several levels of selection in this specification of the model.
Both a person’s own English language skills and the language skills of the
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household influence not only self-employment status, but also labor force par-
ticipation and the probability of being employed. The present analysis selects
only workers who are currently employed, ignoring the effect of Range on the
probability of being in the labor force or employed. Second, the Range vari-
able itself is defined over others in the household who are working, although
who works in the household may itself be determined by the mix of English
skills in the household. Finally, I select households with two or more earners.
In the first selection issue, self-employment is reliably observed only
for those who are actually working. If labor force participation or employa-
bility are systematically correlated with unobserved factors determining self-
employment or if employment and self-employment are jointly determined,
then the estimates might be biased. If some identifying variable could be
identified which affected the probability of working but not self-employment,
a standard Heckman procedure could be used to produce consistent estimates.
However, it is difficult to find such a variable. Factors such as the number
of small children which are used by Mroz to identify labor force participation
probabilities are correlated with self-employment, at least for women. Typi-
cally selection is seen to be an issue for women’s labor supply. However, in
this sample, a substantial percent of men report not being in the labor force
— just under 15%. This percent is higher for those who do not speak English
fluently. Unemployment rates for immigrants are also high for poorer English
speakers.
In the second selection issue is the restriction of the sample to house-
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holds with two or more earners. Because of the way Range is defined, there
is no variability in Range in households with only one earner. This ignores
the issue that household language skills may influence how many people in the
household participate in the labor force and how many actually work.
An alternative definition of the range of household English skills can
be used to examine how they effect labor force participation and employment.
Let Range2 be the range of English skills of all persons in the family between
the ages of 16 and 60, regardless of whether they work or not. The language
variables for others in the household are similarly redefined to include the skills
of all family members between the ages of 16 and 60.
Results are reported in Tables 3.12 and 3.13. Range2 has a negative
effect on men’s labor force participation and on the employment rate of men
who are in the labor force. It has a small positive effect on women’s partici-
pation and employment. For both men and women, having additional family
members who speak good, poor, or no English instead of very good English
is associated with higher participation rates and higher employment among
those on the labor market. For men who speak very good English, the range
of English skills has no effect on labor force participation or employment. All
women, however, are more likely to be in the labor force if others in their
household speak good, poor, or no English rather than very good English.
Household English has less of an effect on the probability of being
employed given that one is in the labor force, but good, poor, and non-English
speakers are more likely to be employed if others in the household are also less
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than very-good English speakers.
Finally, controlling for the number of persons 16–60 in the household,
households with a greater range of English skills have fewer earners on average.
Controlling for the number of persons in the family 16 and up, each additional
increment of Range2 is associated with decrease of .08 in the number of persons
in the household who are currently working.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter has examined one way in which household human capital
might affect self-employment. It presents a model in which immigrants with
different language skills can cooperate to earn more together than they would
be able to earn individually. Although it fits in naturally with families that
maximize family utility or are altruistic, it does not require these assumptions.
Immigrants with poorer language skills are less likely to be self-employed.
However, this is mostly because these immigrants are on average younger and
have less education and less experience in the U.S.. At a given educational
level, immigrants who speak English poorly or well are more likely to be self-
employed than those who speak English very well.
Household English skills also matter for individual self-employment. In
the sample of all working immigrants in the target range, adding one level
to the range of English skills to the household increases self-employment by
about 3% (.3 percentage points) overall and for men, with a larger effect on
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families with more earners.
In addition, there is a positive effect on self-employment of having oth-
ers in the family who speak a different level of English. Very good speakers are
more likely to be self-employed if there is an additional poor or non-speaker
of English in the family, and vice-versa. This pattern is stronger for men
than for women. For men who speak English very well, having an additional
non-English-speaker or poor speaker rather than a very good English speaker
increases the self-employment probability by 1.5 and 1.4 percentage points re-
spectively, while it reduces self-employment for non-/poor English speakers by
.8 percentage points. Having an additional non-English speaker increases the
probability of self-employment of a women who speak English very well by
1.1 percentage points, but decreases the probability of a non-/poor- English-
speaking women by 1.9 percentage points.
This basic pattern holds for all most regions. It is particularly strong for
East Asia. When the percentage point coefficients are converted into percent
change over mean self-employment, the effects of an additional increase in
household English skills increases the probability of self-employment for very
good speakers from 8% in Mexico to 14% in East Asia. The effect for non-
or poor speakers is significant only for Mexico, where poor speakers are 3.3%
more likely to be self-employed for each increase in the Range variable.
These results provide important information about immigrant self-employment.
First, better English skills do not increase self-employment on their own, al-
though other studies have shown they are associated with increased wages and
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better jobs. However, for households with poor speakers, having an additional
very good speaker does increase self-employment.
An expansion of this chapter might investigate the interaction between
household language skills and linguistic enclaves more extensively. Linguis-
tic enclaves seem to be associated with more self-employment for immigrants
from Mexico and Central America and less self-employment for immigrants
from other regions. The answer may depend on the ethnicity of customers
and potential employees. Larger enclaves, or more concentrated enclaves that
are not observable in the IPUMS data, may create different self-employment
opportunities or change the role of language. Preliminary research indicates
that the interaction between individual and household language skills varies
by region.
Another area that is interesting is the role of isolation in self-employment.
Communities which seek to maintain their cultural heritage or religious ho-
mogeneity — i.e., ones that seek to avoid assimilation - might have a strong
preference for working with members of their own group — people who speak
the same language, laugh at the same jokes, and share the same basic belief
system. Researchers who have examined religion in economic terms show how
strict religious demands can act as sorting mechanisms to ensure a dedicated
membership, and how barriers to interaction with outsiders form an impor-
tant part of these mechanisms. Do groups which seek to maintain communities
with values outside the mainstream have higher rates of self-employment? If
this was true, we might see higher self-employment rates among such groups.
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Not speaking English can be both a consequence of this isolation, but also a
way of keeping outsiders out of the group.
Finally, a complementary model of self-employment for immigrants
would examine self-employment as a way to overcome problems in signaling
qualifications to U.S. employers. Immigrant men who have college-level edu-
cation overseas are more likely to be self-employed, and that these coefficients
are larger for non-English speakers and poor-English speakers than for good
or very good English speakers.
The family may also help employ family members who cannot recognize
their full potential in the labor market in other ways other than language. Self-
employment may offer individuals who are underage or older than usual, want
flexible work hours, or are unable to find work at the minimum wage a better
work package than they could find in wage employment. Self-employment
might provide an opportunity for families to help these workers.
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Table 3.1: Countries by Self-Employment Rate
1 Korea 25.05% 22 Peru 10.93%
2 Greece 25.00% 23 Portugal 10.84%
3 Israel 24.80% 24 India 10.82%
4 Iran 21.92% 25 Nigeria 10.34%
5 Italy 18.10% 26 Thailand 10.33%
6 Brazil 17.94% 27 Africa NS 10.00%
7 Argentina 16.73% 28 Guatemala 9.78%
8 Ireland 15.47% 29 Ecuador 9.56%
9 Pakistan 14.99% 30 Yugoslavia 9.12%
10 Poland 14.66% 31 El Salvador 9.00%
11 Cuba 13.17% 32 Dominican Rep. 8.90%
12 Canada 13.12% 33 Nicaragua 8.73%
13 France 12.97% 34 Honduras 7.81%
14 England 12.52% 35 Mexico 7.79%
15 Germany 12.46% 36 Trinidad 7.31%
16 USSR (Non-Balt) 12.32% 37 Jamaica 6.87%
17 Japan 12.21% 38 Br. West Indies 6.25%
18 Colombia 12.08% 39 Guyana 6.14%
19 China 11.16% 40 Laos 5.46%
20 Vietnam 11.12% 41 Philipines 5.26%
21 Cambodia 11.00% 42 Haiti 5.01%
Includes all workers 25-60. Countries with 2,500 or more persons in sample
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V. Good 0.316 0.465
Only 0.142 0.349




Yrs in US 13.69 9.16
Self-Employed 0.12 0.32





U.S. Citizen 0.404 0.491
Household
Range of HH English 0.590 0.817
Eng Ave 3.464 1.065
Ave. Edu 11.92 3.81
Ave. Yrs in US 18.02 13.48
Ave. Age 36.26 10.29
Children ¡5 0.215 0.512




South America 0.073 0.261
Western Europe 0.068 0.252
Eastern Europe 0.093 0.290
East Asia 0.112 0.315
Southeast Asia 0.142 0.349
Southwest Asia 0.056 0.230
Middle East 0.030 0.170
Africa 0.029 0.167
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Table 3.3: Distribution of Range of Household English Skills by Own English
Skills
Range of Own English
English None Poor Good Very Good
0 29.40% 33.36% 43.62% 78.55%
1 30.99% 33.99% 46.19% 13.51%
2 19.87% 29.86% 8.98% 6.19%
3 19.73% 2.79% 1.21% 1.75%
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Table 3.4: Self-Employment by Year and Gender, Weighted Means
Year English Level All Men Women
No English 0.033 0.037 0.028
Poor English 0.072 0.079 0.064
1980 Good English 0.110 0.133 0.082
Very Good English 0.121 0.155 0.087
Only English 0.123 0.164 0.087
No English 0.065 0.060 0.071
Poor English 0.110 0.106 0.116
1990 Good English 0.135 0.147 0.120
Very Good English 0.132 0.155 0.106
Only English 0.138 0.158 0.118
No English 0.069 0.055 0.091
Poor English 0.111 0.099 0.128
2000 Good English 0.130 0.136 0.122
Very Good English 0.116 0.135 0.095
Only English 0.125 0.142 0.106
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Table 3.5: Probit Regressions: Own English Skills and Self-Employment
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
No English -0.061 -0.047 -0.015 -0.008
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Poor English -0.019 -0.006 0.016 0.012
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)***
Good English 0.004 0.010 0.018 0.013
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Only English 0.007 0.009 0.004 -0.006
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Yrs. Edu. 0.002 0.002 0.004
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Edu. Sq. 0 0 0
(0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Yrs. in U.S. 0.007 0.004
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Yrs. U.S. Sq. 0 0
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Obs. 651,215 651,215 651,215 651,215








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.7: Effect of Household English Skills on Self-Employment
All Men Women
No English -0.006 -0.021 0.005
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)
Poor English 0.010 -0.005 0.026
(0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.002)***
Good English 0.011 0.007 0.015
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Only English 0.000 -0.005 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)** (0.002)
Other Nonspeakers -0.008 -0.002 -0.010
(0.001)*** (0.002) (0.002)***
Other Poor Speakers -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Good Speakers 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Only English -0.006 -0.005 -0.007
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Range of HH English 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)
Ave. Edu. Others 0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Ave. Age Others 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.000)*** 0.000 (0.000)***
Ave. Yrs US Others 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)
Overseas College 0.009 0.016 0.001
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)
Observations 651,215 354,543 296,672
Wald Tests:
Own Eng: 163.74 125.63 189
HH Eng: 94.13 18.29 57.57
Controls for marital status, number of children, age, education, and years
in the US and their quadratics, number of earners in the household,
state of residence, year and region of origin also included.
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Table 3.8: Effect of Household English Skills on Self-Employment, Men
No/Poor Good V. Good Only
Other Nonspeakers -0.008 -0.005 0.015 0.023
(0.002)*** (0.004) (0.005)*** (0.011)**
Other Poor Speakers -0.006 0.001 0.014 0.010
(0.002)*** (0.003) (0.003)*** (0.011)
Other Good Speakers -0.004 -0.002 0.006 -0.008
(0.002)** (0.002) (0.002)** (0.010)
Other Only English -0.001 -0.014 -0.008 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.005)
Ave. Edu. Others 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.006
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** 0.000 (0.001)***
Ave. Age Others 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ave. Yrs US Others 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Overseas College 0.019 0.010 0.011 0.024
(0.004)*** (0.004)** (0.003)*** (0.005)***
US Citizen 0.007 -0.002 0.000 -0.016
(0.002)*** (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)***
Children<5 -0.003 0.001 0.000 0.014
(0.002)* (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)***
Own Children 0.005 0.010 0.011 0.001
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)
Other HH Workers 0.001 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003) (0.005)**
Observations 107,074 94,628 107,355 45,486
Wald Test:
HH Eng: 26.08 24.08 45.29 7.75
Marital status, state of residence and region of origin also in regression.
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Table 3.9: Effect of Household English Skills on Self-Employment, Women
No/Poor Good V. Good Only
Other Nonspeakers -0.019 -0.008 0.011 0.007
(0.003)*** (0.006) (0.007)* (0.012)
Other Poor Speakers -0.007 0.002 0.003 0.012
(0.002)*** (0.003) (0.004) (0.009)
Other Good Speakers -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 0.012
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
Other Only English -0.006 -0.010 -0.007 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.005)
Ave. Edu. Others 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Ave. Age Others 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Ave. Yrs US Others 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
0.000 (0.000)*** (0.000)* 0.000
Overseas College -0.013 0.001 0.006 0.001
(0.004)*** (0.004) (0.003)** (0.004)
US Citizen 0.001 -0.007 0.000 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003)*** (0.002) (0.003)*
Childen<5 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.025
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)** (0.004)***
Own Children 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)
Other HH Workers 0.006 0.003 0.007 0.002
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***
Observations 77,921 73,341 98,552 46,858
Wald Test
HH Eng: 62.41 15.15 18.21 8.39
Marital status, state of residence and region of origin also in regression.
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Table 3.10: Effect of Range of Language Skills and Language Prevalence
Specification 1: With Log Language Prevalence
Men Women
All No/Poor Good VGood All No/Poor Good V. Good
Range 0.0040 0.0007 0.0041 0.0102 0.0026 0.0006 0.0006 0.0028
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0017)
Log Lan. Prev. -0.0020 -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0032 -0.0030 -0.0027 -0.0034 -0.0031
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Obs. 292,011 100,976 89,925 101,110 235,878 73,779 69,455 92,644
Specification 2: with Nonlog Language Prevalence
Men Women
All No/Poor Good V. Good All No/Poor Good V. Good
Range 1-4 0.0022 0.0000 0.0035 0.0089 0.0011 0.0003 0.0019 0.0010
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0017)
Lan. Prev. 0.0498 0.0534 0.0320 0.0249 -0.0126 -0.0048 -0.0293 -0.0227
(0.0054) (0.0064) (0.0101) (0.0111) (0.0056) (0.0081) (0.0123) (0.0114)
Obs. 292,011 100,976 89,925 101,110 235,878 73,779 69,455 92,644
Baseline Without Language Prevalence
Men Women
All No/Poor Good V. Good All No/Poor Good V. Good
Range 0.007 0.001 0.024 0.055 0.005 0.003 0.011 0.013
(0.001)*** -(0.0010) (0.010)** (0.009)*** (0.001)*** -(0.0080) -(0.0120) -(0.0110)
Obs. 292,011 100,976 89,925 101,110 235,878 73,779 69,455 92,644
All specification excludes only English speakers. Household Ave. Eng. controlled for in All specification.
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Table 3.11: Effect of Household English Range by Region,Men
Mexico
All No/Poor Good V. Good
dy/dx Range: 0.0023 0.0025 -0.0022 0.0069
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0021)
Mean Range 0.9769 1.0715 0.9828 0.6567
Obs. 120,875 68,055 32,110 20,701
East Asia
All No/Poor Good V. Good
dy/dx Range: 0.0085 -0.0161 0.0161 0.0279
(0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0076) (0.0075)
Mean Range 0.6468 0.9099 0.5695 0.4547
Obs. 30,770 10,069 11,560 9,141
Southeast Asia
All No/Poor Good V. Good
dy/dx Range: 0.0101 -0.0065 0.0089 0.0204
(0.0029) (0.0069) (0.0043) (0.0042)
Mean Range 0.5008 0.9441 0.5708 0.2953
Obs. 38,805 6,118 14,389 18,203
Southwest Asia
All No/Poor Good V. Good
dy/dx Range: 0.0114 0.0040 0.0150 0.0092
(0.0075) (0.0213) (0.0135) (0.0080)
Mean Range 0.3841 1.2083 0.5652 0.2562
Obs. 18,583 1,061 4,326 13,134
Middle East
All No/Poor Good V. Good
dy/dx Range: 0.0098 0.0118 0.0114 0.0145
(0.0106) (0.0299) (0.0207) (0.0136)
Mean Range 0.3874 1.1852 0.5628 0.2261
Obs. 10,225 648 2,896 6,600
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Table 3.12: Effects of Language on Labor Force Participation
Men Women
No English -0.05 -0.161
(0.003)*** (0.004)***
Poor English -0.046 -0.089
(0.002)*** (0.003)***
Good English -0.032 -0.04
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
Only English -0.031 -0.064
(0.003)*** (0.003)***
Other Nonspeakers 0.017 0.045
(0.001)*** (0.002)***
Other Poor Speakers 0.013 0.028
(0.001)*** (0.001)***
Other Good Speakers 0.003 0.011
(0.001)*** (0.001)***








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Quality vs. Quantity: The Effect of an
Additional Child on Sibling Educational
Progress
4.1 Introduction and Background
High fertility has long been associated with lower educational attain-
ment. Cross-sectional and panel microdata from many countries show that
families with more children tend to invest less per child on average and have
children with lower educational attainment. Along the development path of
most countries, the average level of education is observed to increase as total
fertility decreases. Across countries, the average level of education is inversely
correlated with the average fertility rate.
In the economics literature, this inverse relationship between fertility
and education is often explained as a tradeoff between the quantity and quality
of children. Investments of time and resources improve the quality of children,
but this quality is costly. Thus, having a given quantity of children is more
costly the higher the desired quality for each child. Becker and Lewis (1973)
formalized this model of the quality-quantity tradeoff, showing how increasing
child quantity increases the shadow price of child quality and increasing child
quality increases the shadow price of child quantity.
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The quality-quantity tradeoff is not the only way the empirical evidence
can be explained. Caring for children is relatively more expensive compared
to other uses of time for more educated women, so all else equal they can be
expected to have fewer children in the context of a home production model.
Since mother’s education is likely to be positively correlated with children’s
education,1 this could also result in the observed relationship.
Parents may also overinvest in children if they have few, if there is
uncertainty about the outcome from a given set of inputs, and if there is a
certain minimal level of final offspring quality desired. For example, parents
may care not about the average quality of each child, but about having at
least one child survive to adulthood with enough education to secure a good
job. On a more mechanistic level, more educated women are also likely to
marry and begin having children at an older age. Apart from any economic
considerations, this will tend to reduce family size on average because of a
shorter child-bearing horizon.
Understanding the relationship between total fertility and children’s ed-
ucation is important for development policy. Investment in human capital has
widely seen as promoting growth (Krueger and Lindahl, 2001). If decreased
fertility increases educational attainment on its own, a family-planning pol-
1There are many reasons mother’s education might be highly correlated with children’s
education. Women with a high level of education themselves are more likely to value ed-
ucation for their children, may be more efficient in providing education (Behrman et al.
(1994)), and are likely to live in communities with more resources available for education
(Montgomery, Kuenning and Mete, (2000)).
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icy may have greater importance in a wider development agenda. Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1980a), for example, present their finding that additional chil-
dren decrease siblings’ education as a possible argument for family planning.
Ahn et al. (1998) notes that the Vietnamese government justifies its policies
to lower fertility in part by the expectation that lower fertility will increase
children’s education. If the quality-quantity tradeoffs are not an important
part of education decisions, then lowering family size without changing other
family attitudes will not lead to increased education. Apart from population
policy, understanding how family structure influences educational outcomes
may help policy makers in promoting education through developing targeted
interventions.
It is difficult to differentiate between quality-quantity tradeoffs and
other factors which might lead to lower education in large families. Standard
OLS regression of child education on family size will produce biased coefficients
because of the endogeneity of the number of children. Including controls for
the value of the mother’s time outside of the household, such as her own
education or predicted wage, partly controls for alternative explanations, but
does not completely account for underlying preferences or the possible joint
determination of number of children and average child education.
Most empirical studies have taken this approach. Generally, these stud-
ies find a negative effect of the number of siblings on education (Kessler,
(1991)), but some find no result or qualified results. Kessler (1991) finds
no evidence that the number of siblings influences wage levels or growth in
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the US. Ahn et al (1998) find that the number of siblings affects educational
attainment in Vietnam only for the largest families (those with five or more
children). They find a negative effect of family size on school attendance,
leading to the conclusion that additional children may interrupt their siblings’
education but that the children eventually catch up. Marteleto’s (2001) re-
sults also indicate a negative effect on enrollment and achievement only at
the largest family sizes. Grawe (2003a) finds that young children with more
siblings have lower development indicators, but it is unclear which, if any,
controls are included.
Given the prominence of the fertility-education debate in the develop-
ment literature, relatively few researchers have examined the empirical effect
of an exogenous child on sibling’s education. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a)
use twins to examine the quantity-quality tradeoff in India, concluding that
an exogenous child decreases education both for the twins themselves and for
their siblings by about the same amount. Lee (2004) uses the birth of a daugh-
ter in the first birth as an IV to analyze the effect of family size on parent’s
investment in children’s education in Korea, and concludes the opposite: that
additional children have no impact on siblings’ education, and that observed
differences are due to high covariance between tastes for education and tastes
for a small family.
This chapter uses the birth of twins as a natural experiment to test if
additional siblings have a negative effect on child education levels apart from
any underlying preferences about education or family size. The birth of twins
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in a given pregnancy is a shock to the number of children in the household
which is uncorrelated with families’ preferences for children or education or
the relative value of time spent in market versus home production. Therefore,
it presents a good instrument for the number of children in the household.
The approach is similar to that used by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a).
Mexico is an interesting case for such an analysis. Fertility behavior
has changed rapidly in Mexico since 1970, resulting in a decrease from a total
fertility rate of 7 children per woman in 1960 to 2.4 children in 2002. At
the same time, the labor force participation of Mexican women has increased
dramatically, with many jobs for women now entailing relatively skilled work.
Primary education is virtually universally available in Mexico, while secondary
education, which has been compulsory until age 15 in Mexico since 1992, is
available in almost all urban areas. Thus, Mexico is a very different case from
India, which was studied by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a). However, Mexico
remains relatively more traditional in family roles than the U.S. and Western
Europe, with larger family sizes, greater gender specialization, less education,
and lower average incomes.
In addition to expanding the work of other researchers on the quality-
quantity tradeoff by presenting additional empirical evidence, this paper presents
several innovations. The relatively large sample of twins enables the examina-
tion of two specific questions on how additional siblings might effect children’s
education. First, do closely spaced siblings hurt children’s education? If chil-
dren are competing for resources in families with budget constraints, then a
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closely spaced child would be expected to have a greater impact. Second, do
additional young children adversely effect older sisters? Since girls take on
more responsibility for household chores, including child care, additional chil-
dren might effect them disproportionately. Women’s education has a greater
impact on children’s education and on reduced fertility. Thus, reducing fertil-
ity might be especially valuable in the long run if it had a positive effect on
girls’ education. Alternatively, ways might be sought to provide helping girls
with many siblings.
4.2 Methodology
The general methodology is to use the birth of twins to instrument for
the total number of children in the household. If the quality-quantity model
is correct, an additional child should increase the shadow price of child quality
and lead to a decrease in the both investment in children’s education and
in average educational levels of children in the household. I consider three
separate measures of average family child quality: educational attainment,
educational progress, and weekly study hours.
Educational attainment is a measure of a quality output, and thus
provides a different approach than looking at investment into education, which
is a quality input. Focusing on attainment takes into consideration the impact
of a wide variety of inputs to quality. In addition to monetary resources,
parents also invest their time and energy. More indirect investments, such as
a peaceful home environment, space to study, expenditures on health care and
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safety, and location next to a school are also aspects of investment in child
quality which may be constrained by the addition of children to the family.
Children may also provide positive or negative spill overs to each other.
Educational attainment is a stock variable which depends on the entire
path of a child’s education progress. It is difficult to determine whether poor
educational attainment is due to late entry into school or to lagging at a later
age. The panel nature of the data provides a measure of a flow indicator of
child quality: average educational progress. This is the average change in
education from the first interview to the last interview. For children who are
in the sample at least a year, the level of education should increase by one year
if they are attending school and pass. the sample to those who are interviewed
a maximum of 12-15 months apart, Including children who are in the sample
12-15 months implies that children progressing at the planned rate should have
one year’s more education at the end of their participation in the survey than
they did at the beginning.
Hours of study time per week provides a measure of investment in
education, or a quality input. Parents’ investment in children’s education is
usually measured by monetary expenditures for school fees, supplies, and other
goods necessary for education. However, in the context of a country where even
young children may help out in the house or in income-generating activities,
children’s time itself represents one aspect of investment in education. Because
it is a flow variable (unlike educational attainment, which is a stock), it can
capture more clearly differences in the effects of a sibling at different ages.
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4.2.1 Data
The data are the Mexican government’s National Survey of Urban Em-
ployment (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, or ENEU) from 1994 to 1999.
This is a quarterly household survey that interviews approximately 100,000
households in urban areas of Mexico every quarter. Urban areas are defined
as those with more than 2,500 residents. The survey provides representation
for 95% of the population in cities with a population over 100,000. Households
are in the survey for five periods for a total period of up to 15 months. Basic
demographic and educational information is collected on every member of the
household, and more detailed information on household members over twelve.
School years are recorded in the data for children six and up, and study hours
per week for children 12 and older.
Twins are identified by matching children who live in the same house-
hold and have the same age, place of birth, and relationship to household head.
To ensure that the children are not closely-spaced singletons, all children must
be in the sample a minimum of three interviews. Triplets and higher multiple
births and families with multiple twins are excluded from the analysis.
The unit of analysis is a family unit of parents and their own children.
There may be several related families living in one household, all of which
are treated separately. I select families who have all children living at home,
no married children or grandchildren, and no more children than the mother
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has given birth to2. In extended households with multiple adults/couples with
children, I match parents to children where possible and count each group as a
separate family. To minimize the risk of selection, I limit the sample to families
whose oldest child is 18 years or younger. A small number of families where
the mother was less than 15 at the time of her first birth are also excluded.
Finally, only families who have a mother present are included.
4.2.2 Use of Twins as an Instrument
While the birth of twins in a given birth is exogenous, the overall num-
ber of twins in a family is not. Women who have more pregnancies have more
opportunities to have a set of twins, which means that the overall incidence
of twins in the family is correlated with desired family size. The twins instru-
ment must therefore represent the birth of twins in a given pregnancy or set
of pregnancies.
One way to do this is to look only at the birth of twins in the first
birth (the “twins-first” IV or Twins-1). This instrument is desirable because
it can be used to analyze the effect of a marginal child for all women who have
had at least one child, and has been the most widely used twins instrument.
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b) use the twins-first IV to examine women’s life-
cycle labor supply, Grogger and Bronars (1994) to examine the relationship
between welfare benefits and the marriage and fertility of unwed mothers, and
Jacobsen, Pearce, and Rosenbloom (1999) to examine parents’ labor supply.
2Such children might be stepchildren or adopted children.
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However, the twins-first IV is problematic for the Mexican case because
women are able to adjust fertility. Most women in Mexico who have children
have more than one — only 6% of women in the full sample on households
without a twin birth (women with at least one child between the ages of 6 and
18) have only one child. Families who have twins in the first birth are able
to completely adjust fertility. Column I of Table 4.1 summarizes the number
of additional children, on average, in households which had twins in the first
birth compared to households which had singletons by the age of the first child.
Twin families have only .36 more children in the household when the child is
7 years old, and there is no significant difference by the time the child is 9
years old. There are actually slightly fewer children in twins-first households
by the time the child passes 15 (probably because older women are more likely
to have twins). Thus, the incidence of a twin in the first birth is best seen as
a shock to the spacing of children rather than as a shock to family size.
A simple alternative is to use twins born in the first two or three births,
which restricts the representative sample of the results to families who have
had at least two and at least three births. The Twins-1-2 and Twins-1-2-3
variables are equal to one if the mother has twins in the first or second or first
three births, respectively. Families in these households also adjust fertility over
time, so that the difference between the average number of children in a family
with twins and that of a family without twins is less than one. Families with
a twin in the Twins-1-2 sample have on average .38 more children than those
that do not(Table 4.1, Column 2), while families with twins in the Twins-1-2-3
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sample have on average .70 more children (Table 4.1 , Column 3). This makes
Twins-1-2 and Twins-1-2-3 better suited as instruments for overall fertility in
this case, although Twins-1 is still useful for examining the effect of a closely-
spaced sibling.
Using these variables means that all marginal effects must be inter-
preted as the effect of adding an additional child to a family with at least two
or three children already. However, the Twins-1 sample would be similarly
restricted. Since the analysis examines the education of siblings of twins, only
households with two or more births can be included to ensure comparability.
For the specifications which consider the effect of an additional child on
a specific sibling, I use variables which indicate the birth of twins in a specific
birth. The Twins-2 variable is defined for women with at least two births
and is equal to one for women who have twins in the second birth, and the
Twins-3 is defined for all women with at least three births and is equal to one
for women with twins in the third birth.
Results differ for the IVs which include households with at least two
children (Twins-1-2 and Twins-2) and those which include households with at
least three children (Twins-1-2-3 and Twins-3). However, there is little sub-
stantial difference between the coefficients and standard errors of the Twins-1-2
and Twins-2 and the Twins-1-2-3 and the Twins-3 variables. The advantage
of the Twins-1-2 and the Twins-1-2-3 specifications is that the sample size is
larger. However, the Twins-2 and Twins-3 allows birth rank to be controlled
for and are easier to interpret.
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4.3 Model
The specification of interest is




where Q is the measure of average family child quality and CHILDREN
is the total number of children born in the family. Since CHILDREN is as-
sumed to be endogenous, the twin instruments described above are use to
instrument for it.
The measures for Q are the average adjusted education and average
educational progress of all non-twin children in the household and average ad-
justed weekly study hours of non-twin children 12-15. This follows Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1980a), who conducted a similar analysis using educational at-
tainment. Twins themselves are excluded from the analysis because they may
have other health or developmental problems which influence their educational
progress apart from family size. The sample is already restricted to households
with 2 or more births, so there are no problems of comparability.
To compare children of different ages, education and study hours are
adjusted by age and state of residence. Adjustment for state of residence serves
to control for any differences in twinning rates between states. Thus, adjusted
education ADJEDi is defined for each child i as
ADJEDi = EDUi/AV EEDac
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where EDUi is years of education successfully completed and AV EEDac
is average years of education for all children of season and age a and state of
residence c; and adjusted weekly study hours are defined for all children over
12 as
ADJSTUDYi = STUDYi/AV ESTUDYac
with STUDYi being weekly hours of study and AV ESTUDYac average
study hours for all children of the same age and state3.
Educational progress is the difference between educational attainment
in the first and last interviews of the family and is defined for children who
are in the sample at least a year, or
PROGRESSi = EDUi,t=5 − EDUi,t=1
for children in the sample five times and
3AV EEDac and AV ESTUDYac are based on all children in the ENEU data set, not the
smaller set of households in the sample. Average age is calculated by quarter and season
of the interview, so that children observed in the Fall are compared to children of the same
quarterly age also interview in the Fall. This provides a more precise measure of educational
attainment by age. However, the average education of older children in the sample is higher
than in the population at large because of the way the sample is selected. Because the sample
includes only children from families with all children present and an oldest child younger
than 18, older children in the sample are more likely to come from small families and to be
of a lower birth-rank than children in the entire ENEU data set. To make ages comparable,
average education is further normalizes by dividing by the average in the sample at each
age.
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PROGRESSi = EDUi,t=4 − EDUi,t=1
for children in the sample four times.













for each household j, where NT is the number of children in each family
who are not themselves twins.
Because error terms might be correlated for families within the same
household, robust standard errors are calculated which account for clustering
on the household.
If twins are uncorrelated with other variables that influence average
educational attainment, excluding other determinants of child quality will not
effect the coefficients on the twins IVs. However, the probability of having
a twin is correlated with mother’s age and parity. Therefore, the age of the
mother at the time of birth is controlled for. Mother’s age at birth for the first
two and three births respectively for the Twins-1-2 and Twins-1-2-3 specifi-
cations. The correlation with parity is much smaller and applies mostly to
births of larger birth ranks, so it has minimal effect.
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4.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.2 gives the numbers of women and total observations in the
sample for each instrument used. In the Twins-1-2 sample, I have multiple
observations on 36,098 children from 15,034 families with two or more births.
Of these, 1,197 children are the siblings of twins and 1,714 children are them-
selves twins and are excluded. There are 1,078 twin families in all. For the
Twins-1-2-3 sample, there are 28,789 children in 10,161 families with three or
more births. Of these, 1,490 children are the siblings of twins and 1,178 are
themselves twins. There are 806 households with twins.
Chart 1 shows average years of educational attainment by age. Educa-
tional attainment advances linearly at an average of a little less than a year
of education per year of age until age 15, when it slowly begins to fall. This
is the maximum age of compulsory education in Mexico, so the decreasing
slope represents higher levels of school exits. Chart 2 shows average adjusted
education for children 6–18 by family size. Adjusted education is lower for
families with more than 5 children, but it appears about the same for other
households.
Without controlling for the sample or mothers’ age at time of birth,
the adjusted education for twins and the siblings of twins appears the same
as that of children from families without twins after age 8 (Chart 3). Both
twins and twin siblings lag in education between the ages of 6-8, indicating
later school enrollment. However, they are able to catch up rapidly, so that
by age 8 there is no difference.
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4.4.1 Comparison of Twin and Nontwin Families
There are some differences in characteristics of twin and non-twin fam-
ilies. Table 4.3 gives means of relevant variables for all non-twin and twin
households over all families in the Twins-1-2 and Twins-1-2-3 samples. Twin
families have more children on average, but less that one additional child more:
families in the Twins-1-2 sample have on average only .37 more children, and
families in the Twins-1-2-3 sample have .67 more children than families with-
out twins. Mothers of twins are a little more than half a year older than other
mothers on average, and begin having children later. The age at first birth
is over a year later in the Twin-1-2 sample. Both the mothers and fathers of
twins have slightly more education, and twin households have higher average
real income.
Twin families also differ in some ways related to child spacing and sex
ratio. Child spacing is closer in twin families. There is an average of 6.8 and
8.2 years difference between the oldest and youngest child in non-twin families,
compared with 5.6 and 7.8 years for twin families. Twin families are somewhat
more likely to have a girl born in the first pregnancy. The sibling sex ratio
on average is about the same over all twin and non-twin families, but twin
families are more likely to have more children of the same sex, because some
twin births are identical twins.
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4.4.2 Are Twin Births Exogenous?
For twins to be a valid instrument, there must be no covariance between
the birth of twins and the error term. The differences between the twin and
non-twin samples raise the question of whether twins are truly exogenous. If
parents of twins have more education or income than parents of non-twins
after controlling for mother’s age at time of birth, then twins are not a valid
instrument. I run several regressions to check the correlation between variables
that impact education that might also be correlated with having a twin. After
including mother’s age at the time of birth, parents’ education and income are
not significant predictors of having a twin.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Household Average Adjusted Education
An additional child decreases sibling’s education attainment, as shown
in Column 1 of Table 4.44. For the sample of children age 6–18, having an addi-
tional child decreases education by about 9.4-11.2%. However, when separate
regressions are run by age, only younger children are affected. The education
of children 6–11 is decreased by 17.1–17.9%, but there is no significant effect
at older ages. Coefficients for the Twins-1-2 specification are actually positive,
4In preliminary regressions on the average household adjusted education of all children in
the family, including twins, I find children from twin families have significantly less average
education. When the sample is restricted to households with 2 or more births, however,
the results are significant only for the Twins-1-2-3 sample and are not significant for older
children. The results excluding twins themselves are only slightly smaller.
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although insignificant.
Coefficients on other measures of quality are also mostly positive and
insignificant. For study hours, there is no significance at all. For average educa-
tional progress, the T-statistics approach one in the overall sample. This would
indicate that children in families with an additional child actually progress
more quickly. In separate regressions with children under 7 removed from the
analysis, twin siblings had no significant effect on average education. It ap-
pears an additional child effect siblings mostly by delaying the start of school,
but that afterwards lagging childen progress through school more quickly so
that there is no observed effect of an additional sibling at older ages.
The way the sample is selected leads to two possible problems which
would tend to bias the coefficient on the twins IV and might mask a negative
effect of additional children on older siblings. Because the sample is comprised
of families with no children over 18 and all children at home, older children in
particular are predominantly those with a lower birth order and children from
smaller families. Additional children may have a negative effect primarily on
children of higher birth ranks or in larger families, who tend to be younger in
this sample because of the way the sample is constructed.
Second, the way the data is constructed would exacerbate any selection
bias resulting from the faster exit of older siblings of twins from the household.
If siblings of twins in poorer quality households are more likely to leave the
family, than there is positive selection of twins into the sample and education
in households with twins will be overestimated.
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To check this, regressions are run on a sample which is not restricted to
households with all children present. Children’s birth rank is assigned by the
number of live births the mother has had, assuming that all children remaining
in the household are the natural children of the woman identified as the mother
and that oldest children leave the household first. This lessens selection issues
for younger children and allows for representation of children of higher birth
ranks at older ages. The results, however, are virtually the same. A positive
coefficient is still found for children 12-18 in the Twins-1-2 sample. There are
no significant results for older children in any of the alternative specifications
of these samples.
The pattern reflected in the IV estimates is different from that obtained
from näıve OLS estimates, indicating that estimates based on OLS may be
endogenous (See Table 4.5). For all households with 2 or more children and
no twins, each additional child decreases education only for children 12-18. The
age of the additional child does not matter. This is consistent with households
which choose more children having lower educational targets and children who
exit school at a younger age, which is the opposite of the twins results.
4.5.2 Individual Specification
The quality-quantity model assumes that parents seek a target level
of average education per child. However, it may be that parents favor some
children over others, or that the effect of an additional sibling depends on child
spacing or the relative age of children. Children are likely to have different
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requirements at different ages for constrained resources such as parental at-
tention, so that siblings with close ages may compete for resources more and
younger children may have a larger impact on other siblings.
Hanushek (1992) finds that the number of children is important for
educational progress, and that birth order and spacing are not important.
However, he looks at the number of young children in the household at any
given time, not total fertility. In this context, he finds that first and last born
children have an advantage because they spend more time in the household
without siblings (who have not been born yet or who have already grown out
of childhood).
The twins experiment can also illuminate this topic. The birth of a twin
can be used to examine the effect of an additional sibling within a given age
range. I use regressions of individual children’s adjusted education on whether
or not they have a twin sibling and mother’s age at time of birth of the twin,
as controlled for above. I use the same twin instrument samples as above.
4.5.3 Do Closely Spaced Siblings Lower Schooling?
If siblings compete for resources within the family, it seems intuitive
that children with additional close siblings might be disadvantaged in educa-
tion. One of the most important resources for young children is parental time,
which is by its nature a limited resource.
OLS regressions on children from households without twins show that
the age distance between siblings matters for educational attainment (Table
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4.6). Among all children 6–11 who have older siblings, an additional year in
age from the next older sibling increases education by approximately 3.4%.
The effect persists for older children, who have an average increase of 2.2% for
each additional year between them and an older sibling. The age difference
between a child and the next younger sibling does not seem as important.
There are small negative coefficients for children 6–11, and significant positive
coefficients for children 12-15 suggesting an increase of .2-.3% in education for
each year in difference of age. An interesting pattern is observed for children
6–11 — having more age from an older sibling has a large positive effect, while
having more age from a younger sibling has a significant negative effect. The
effect is particularly strong and significant for girls. For children with both
a younger and an older sibling, the coefficients are similar but have lower
significance levels.
Results are similar when the effect is measured by indicator variables
for having siblings less than 2 years older or younger (See Table 4.8). A close
older sibling has a negative effect on education for all age groups and both
boys and girls (compared to all children with an older sibling). Having a close
younger sibling is associated with more education for young children, and less
education for boys 12-15.
The positive coefficients on age distance between the next older child
fits a story where children compete for resources. It could be that the older
child wins out, on average, in this competition, so that younger children are
not as much of a threat. For older children, having a closely spaced children is
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preferable to having a much younger sibling, who may receive more parental
attention.
Twins can be taken as a shock to child spacing in addition to as a
shock to the total number of children. This would also offer an alternative
explanation for why twins themselves lag behind when they are younger - they
have no age distance between themselves, so they are competing for resources
throughout childhood.5
I take subsamples of all children with siblings born either two years or
less earlier or two years or less later and run a regression with an indicator
variable for whether or not the next oldest birth or younger birth was twins.
The independent variable is the child’s own adjusted education, adjusted study
hours, and educational progress.
As expected, the effects of a close sibling are stronger than the effects
of an additional sibling in the overall sample (Table 4.7). Having a close twin
is associated with a drop in educational attainment of 8.4-14.1%. Educational
progress is 10.7-16.6% lower for all children. However, again, there is no effect
for older children. The sign of the coefficients varies by sample and significance
levels are low. Separating the sample to look specifically in the effect of older
and younger twins results in small sample sizes. While there is a negative
5Closely spaced children also “compete” for the physical health resources of the mother,
in the sense that close births sap the mother’s health. There is some literature which shows
that low birth weight varies by month due to differences in maternal nutrition, and that
low birth weight can predict health outcomes at older ages. Thus, younger siblings who are
born soon after an older sibling may be disadvantaged even before birth.
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effect of close older and younger twins on education progress for children 6–11,
for older children some coefficients are significant, there is no clear pattern:
some samples show significant negative effect of an additional sibling, and
some significant positive effects.
4.5.4 Do Younger Siblings Draw Girls from School?
Much attention has been paid to the possibility that younger siblings
take time away from girls’ studies. Marteleto (2001) explicitly examines this
issue in her study of Brazil. Since girls might be expected to have more respon-
sibilities in the home, it might be that unplanned children increase demands
on girls’ time in the home, and have a larger negative effect on their education
compared to that of boys. Although additional children will most likely create
additional demand both for housework and for market work, it is usually as-
sumed that the relative value of time in the home will increase6, which would
draw girls into housework since they have a comparative advantage.
If this were the case, additional younger siblings would tend to decrease
the educational attainment of girls more than boys, if demands on girls to work
in the home are greater than demands on boys to leave school and work. Also,
older girls would be negatively affected by the presence of children under school
age in the household.
6A wide body of literature has shown that additional children increase women’s work
in the home and decrease women’s work in the market but have a minimal effect on men’s
time use, if any. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis
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Table 4.10 shows the effect of having a younger twin sibling on years
of schooling greater for girls aged 6–11 than for boys in for households with at
least three children, but not for households with at least two children.
Simple OLS regression (Table 4.11)shows that the naive effect of having
a sibling under 6 years of age depends on age. Neither girls nor boys with a
younger sibling under 6 years of age have significantly fewer years of schooling,
compared to other children with a younger sibling. However, children with a
sibling younger than 6 do have significantly slower educational progress than
children with a younger sibling older than 5. For older girls, having a younger
sibling less than 5 is associated with fewer years of schooling, less time devoted
to study, and slower educational progress. Boys have fewer years of schooling
but a positive effect on study hours. Having a sibling less than 6 years old
compared to children with any younger sibling has an insignificant positive
effect on boys and girls 6–11, but a significant negative effect for boys and
girls 12–18.
For boys, the negative effect is due to the fact that older children with a
sibling under 6 years old have more younger siblings. When the total number
of children in the family is accounted for, boys actually have more educational
attainment. Older girls, however, have 4.5% less study hours and less years of
schooling even when the total number of children in the household is controlled
for.
Comparing children with a twin younger than 6 years of age to children
with a singleton birth younger than 6 years of age treats the twin instrument
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both as a shock both to the total number of young children in the household
and a shock to the total number of children in the household. For younger chil-
dren, years of schooling is less, but educational progress is greater, indicating
that children are catching up. There is no effect for older girls, and a positive
effect on older boys. The fact that this result is observed only in the Twins-2
sample suggests that this result may be an anomaly: families with this wide
of a spread between the first and second born are atypical for Mexico. There
is no significant effect on study hours.
These results indicate that girls 6–11 are hurt by having an additional
younger sibling 0-11 years younger, regardless of whether the total number of
children is controlled for. However, they are catching up quickly, suggesting
again that lower schooling might be because of delayed entry into school. If
there is a benefit to having a younger sibling (for example, mothers might
spend more time at home), it does not help girls.
4.5.5 Selection Issues
As children get older, there is an increasing tendency for them to exit
the household into marriage or migration. Children exiting the household are
usually exiting schooling as well. Thus, there may be a selection problem that
gets worse as children age. There is evidence that ‘poorer quality’ children
exit at a faster rate than better quality children. In the larger ENEU data
set, children aged 18 who do not live with their parents have 8.27 years of
education, while children who live with their parents have a mean education
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level of 9.11 years. Married 18 year olds have a mean education of only 7.45
years, compared to a mean education of 9.11 years for nonmarried 18 year
olds.
If children from twin and non-twin families exit at the same rate, the
mean education will be biased up for the remaining families, but the difference
between twin families and non-twin families will not. There is a more substan-
tial problem if twins or their siblings exit the household at a faster rate than
children from non-twin households. If the pool of twins is selected to higher
quality as the oldest child ages, any negative effect of twins will be dampened,
and twins may appear to have a spurious positive effect on education. This
selection problem would be most severe among older older children, but would
affects all children with older siblings, since the entire household is removed
from the family if one child is absent. This could explain the absence of an
effect of additional siblings for older children.
If the quantity-quality model is correct, than twins would be expected
to exit faster. Either early marriage or work might be a response to budget
constraints caused by additional children. Parish (1993) finds some evidence
from Taiwan that girls who have more siblings marry earlier. Even if this is
not the case, households with more children simply have a greater probability
that at least one of them will leave the family.
If selection is a problem, then the percent of the sample that is in twin
families should decrease as the age of the oldest child in the family increases. I
run a regression with an indicator variable for households with the oldest child
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older than 15 years old. For Twins-1-2 and twins-2, there are significantly fewer
children in households with twins with the oldest child older than 15 years old.
If this is due to twins exiting faster, the result is that the education of twin
families is overestimated in households with older children. However, I find no
correlation between the exit older siblings and the presence of a twin among
younger siblings.
Exit from the household begins well before age 18. It appears to be
more of a problem after age 15, and that girls exit faster than boys. At age 15,
.4% of boys and 3.9% of girls are married; by age 16, 1% of boys and 8.6% of
girls in the overall sample are married. Without data which follows children
after they leave the family, there is no way to correct the selection bias if
it exists. Therefore, the results for older children, and particularly children
16–18, must be treated with suspicion.
4.6 Discussion
These results do not lend convincing support to the quality-quantity
model. Additional children have a negative effect on the average education of
siblings, but only in the younger age group. For children 6–11 years of age,
an additional sibling reduces years of schooling by 17.1–17.9%. The effect on
school progress, however, is ambivalent, and appears positive in the sample of
larger families. No effect is noticed for older children on years of schooling,
weekly study hours, or the advancement rate. Because the result depends
strongly on including children 7 and under in the sample, it appears as if the
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primary effect of additional children is on delaying entry into school. No or
little effect is noticed at later ages.
The positive coefficients on school progress, although not significant,
suggest that children who lag behind because of an additional sibling begin
catching up even at younger ages. How they are able to catch up is not
clear. After age 15, children may catch up by continuing education as others
begin to drop out. For younger children, there is no information on additional
investments in education, such as additional tutoring, study time, or summer
school, which might enable them to catch up.
However, the results also cannot be used to disprove the statement that
additional children lower their siblings’ education. There are several possible
sources of bias which would tend to bias the education of siblings of twins
upwards or towards zero, particularly for older children.
One drawback is that the quality of education is not controlled for,
introducing measurement error. Years of completed education is at best a
proxy for child quality. This will tend to bias the results toward zero. Parents
may substitute public education for private education when there is a shock
to family size. Children with many siblings may fall further down in their
class or be directed to weaker classes and programs. If there is an institutional
reluctance to fail marginal students, then completed years of schooling would
be a weak measure of total education. Arguably, there are larger differences in
quality after age 15. The educational measure, however, does not distinguish
between college-track courses and technical schools which may have different
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qualities. It also does not track children into higher education.
Positive selection of twins into the family could result if additional
siblings led to pressure for children with a weaker attachment to school to exit
the household early.
Finally, the restriction to households with children only in the 6–18
age range, while necessary to control for selection, creates its own problems.
Children I observe over the age of 15 are more likely to be first-born and to be
in smaller families. The evidence seems shows that younger children are more
affected by a larger family. There might be more of an effect if more children
born in later births were observed in secondary school.
These factors could have influenced the weak evidence for a positive ef-
fect of additional siblings found for older boys. However, these positive effects
could be plausible. Several studies have found a positive impact of other sib-
lings on education (Marteleto (2001)). Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1989)
find that, while there was a negative effect of total siblings on average educa-
tion, there was a positive effect of siblings of school age. Several explanations
are consistent with this finding. There could be positive spill overs from addi-
tional children, although it is unclear how a younger child would help an older
sibling. Alternatively, economies of scale could lower the cost of schooling for
each child. Children with twin siblings are also less likely to have very young
children in the household.
Parish (1993) hypothesizes that younger children benefit from having
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older siblings who can provide assistance and additional resources. This im-
plies that older children are hurt by an additional child. However, here the
older girls seem to have no negative effect from having younger children in the
household, and older boys actually appear to benefit.
It may be that an additional young child lowers the per-capita cost per
child of spending time in the home relative to other activities, and leads to
an increase in the amount of total time the mother spends in the house. If
mothers and daughters are substitutes in terms of work in the house, having
an older daughter may enable the mother to work more even if she has a young
child, while having an older son would not. However, while the OLS results
indicated than older girls are hurt by young siblings, the twins regressions
showed no effect.
Following this line of reasoning, one interpretation of delayed school
entry may be that mothers who are staying at home anyway feel less pressure
to put children in school early. If children who start school late are learning
at home, it is not clear that this is a disadvantage in terms of long-term
educational attainment.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the effect of an additional sibling on chil-
dren’s education. A twins experiment is used to separate the effect of number
of children on children’s education from other factors on which may be corre-
lated with both family size and children’s education. Education is adjusted by
132
age and state of residence so that children of different ages can be compared.
Additional siblings have a significant negative impact only on the aver-
age education of younger children. Afterwards, children catch up. There is no
clear negative effect on educational progress. For older children, an additional
child has no clear effect, and is associated with positive coefficients for some
specifications with boys.
Closely spaced siblings have a larger negative effect. There is evidence
that a girl’s education is hurt more than a boy’s by an additional younger
sibling in a family with at least three children. In addition, for girls 12-18
there is no negative effect from having a set of twin siblings under the age of 5
in the household, compared to similar girls with a singleton sibling under the
age of 5.
The general pattern of children lagging behind in education in response
to an additional sibling when young but then catching up contrasts with the
näıve OLS results, which show that additional children primarily effect only
older children. This indicates that families’ educational targets do not change
when they have an additional child. Rather, the observed negative relationship
between additional siblings and education in this sample is due to covariance
between parents’ preference for large families and their educational goals.
A natural extension of this paper would be to more closely examine the
role of small children in changing the public time of parents available to all chil-
dren in the household, and how this affects education. Does a longer presence
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of the mother in the household explain delayed school entry for young chil-
dren? If so, if does this help or hinder their development? Ideally, more precise
measures of educational progress would show short-term effects of additional
siblings at different stages of childhood. It is also important to understand
how children who lag in early education are able to catch up, and whether
they truly catch up or if the inability to distinguish quality of education is
masking continuing lags.
134
Table 4.1: Difference in Mean Fertility by Age of First Child
Age of Twins-1 Twins-1-2 Twins-1-2-3
1st Child Mean Dif. (SE) Mean Dif. (SE) Mean Dif. (SE)
6 0.246 (0.085) 0.833 (0.057) 0.869 (0.047)
7 0.511 (0.117) 0.705 (0.057) 0.893 (0.097)
8 0.393 (0.107) 0.627 (0.061) 0.908 (0.078)
9 0.307 (0.155) 0.723 (0.080) 0.878 (0.069)
10 0.173 (0.133) 0.502 (0.075) 0.925 (0.080)
11 -0.071 (0.130) 0.338 (0.078) 0.770 (0.070)
12 -0.155 (0.121) 0.239 (0.075) 0.795 (0.091)
13 -0.107 (0.141) 0.184 (0.072) 0.569 (0.074)
14 0.372 (0.196) 0.511 (0.108) 0.724 (0.091)
15 -0.332 (0.156) 0.370 (0.122) 0.671 (0.109)
16 -0.374 (0.167) 0.039 (0.105) 0.399 (0.084)
17 -0.129 (0.236) 0.314 (0.144) 0.586 (0.111)
18 -0.248 (0.204) 0.150 (0.104) 0.533 (0.086)
Total 0.001 (0.042) 0.383 (0.026) 0.696 (0.026)
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Table 4.2: Sample Sizes
Number of Observations
Twins-1-2 Twins-1-2-3 Twins-2 Twins-3
Nontwin 133,057 104,542 133,057 104,542
Twin Sibling 4,763 5,959 3,456 3,576
Twin 6,874 4,628 3,798 1,960
Total 144,694 115,129 140,311 110,078
Number of Children
Twins-1-2 Twins-1-2-3 Twins-2 Twins-3
Nontwin 33,187 26,121 33,187 26,121
Twin Sibling 1,197 1,490 861 883
Twin 1,714 1,178 952 510
Total 36,098 28,789 35,000 27,514
Number of Families
Twins-1-2 Twins-1-2-3 Twins-2 Twins-3
Nontwin 13,956 9,355 13,956 9,355
Twin 1,078 806 697 438
Total 15,034 10,161 14,653 9,793
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics, Households with and Without Twins
Families in Twins-1-2 Sample
Nontwin Families (13,841) Twin Families (1,062)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
Number of Children 3.098 (1.104) 3.470 (0.787)
Age, Oldest Child 12.391 (3.754) 11.892 (3.645)
Age, Youngest Child 5.556 (3.745) 6.279 (4.069)
Mother’s Age, 1st Birth 21.742 (4.067) 22.909 (4.161)
Mother’s Current Age 34.152 (5.382) 34.815 (5.385)
Father’s Current Age 37.129 (6.412) 37.487 (6.470)
Mother’s Education 7.301 (3.358) 7.764 (3.415)
Father’s Education 8.606 (3.591) 9.095 (3.456)
Range of Child Ages 6.835 (3.552) 5.613 (3.307)
% Girls Among Children 0.490 (0.296) 0.505 (0.308)
Father’s Real Income 574.2 (817.4) 644.9 (891.6)
Mother’s Real Income 172.3 (354.2) 207.2 (367.0)
Total Household Income 818.1 (929.6) 926.3 (1009.2)
Parents Married 0.831 (0.375) 0.830 (0.376)
Common-law Marriage 0.076 (0.264) 0.062 (0.242)
Families in Twins 1-2-3 Sample
Nontwin Families (9,311) Twin Families (791)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
Number of Children 3.633 (0.968) 4.321 (0.696)
Age, Oldest Child 13.204 (3.521) 13.197 (3.442)
Age, Youngest Child 5.055 (3.530) 5.437 (3.693)
Mother’s Age, 1st Birth 21.172 (3.774) 21.703 (3.751)
Mother’s Current Age 34.392 (5.069) 34.920 (5.041)
Father’s Current Age 37.520 (6.186) 38.148 (5.973)
Mother’s Education 6.910 (3.312) 7.028 (3.314)
Father’s Education 8.189 (3.622) 8.326 (3.496)
Range of Child Ages 8.149 (3.286) 7.760 (3.194)
% Girls Among Children 0.492 (0.271) 0.512 (0.275)
Father’s Real Income 564.0 (837.3) 560.7 (750.2)
Mother’s Real Income 146.2 (295.2) 151.3 (342.2)
Total Household Income 782.8 (925.3) 798.5 (871.6)
Parents Married 0.843 (0.364) 0.845 (0.363)
Common-law Marriage 0.083 (0.277) 0.066 (0.248)
*Based in 12,437 nontwin and 924 twin fathers in Twins-1-2 and 8,561 nontwin and














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.5: Effect of Additional Child on Adjusted Education (OLS)
All 6-11 12-18 All 6-11 12-18
Girl 0.047 0.061 0.029 0.047 0.061 0.029
(0.015)*** (0.025)** (0.003)*** (0.015)*** (0.025)** (0.003)***
Mother’s Age, 1st Birth -0.003 -0.008 0.007 0 -0.012 0.009
(0.005) (0.008) (0.001)*** (0.007) (0.014) (0.001)***
Mother’s Age at Birth 0.01 0.019 -0.003 0.007 0.023 -0.006
(0.005)** (0.007)*** (0.001)*** (0.007) (0.013)* (0.001)***
Father’s Age at Birth -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001)** (0.001) (0.000)*** (0.001)** (0.001) (0.000)***
Mother’s Education 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.005
(0.003)** (0.005) (0.001)*** (0.003)** (0.005) (0.001)***
Father’s Education 0.01 0.012 0.008 0.01 0.011 0.008
(0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)***
Number of Children -0.002 0.003 -0.02
(0.007) (0.013) (0.001)***
Children 0-5 -0.002 0.028 -0.022
(0.012) (0.019) (0.002)***
Children 6-11 -0.014 -0.021 -0.023
(0.010) (0.018) (0.002)***
Children 12-15 0.016 0.001 -0.016
(0.010) (0.026) (0.002)***
Children 6-18 0.009 -0.019 -0.01
(0.019) (0.051) (0.004)***
Constant 0.728 0.582 0.938 0.73 0.567 0.919
(0.056)*** (0.098)*** (0.011)*** (0.051)*** (0.088)*** (0.010)***
Observations 133,601 77,643 55,958 133,601 77,643 55,958

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.10: Effect of A Younger Sibling by Gender
6-18 Year Olds 6-11 Year Olds 12-18 Year Olds
Twins-2 Twins-3 Twins-2 Twins-3 Twins-2 Twins-3
Twin Sibling -0.023 0.023 -0.051 0.051 0.015 0
(0.023) (0.026) (0.040) (0.055) (0.012) (0.012)
Girl*Twin Sib 0.007 -0.075 0.014 -0.148 -0.012 -0.012
(0.035) (0.033)** (0.070) (0.068**) (0.018) (0.017)
Girl 0.031 0.034 0.039 0.041 0.026 0.028
(0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.021*) (0.018**) (0.004***) (0.003***)
Obs. 59,781 75,447 26,509 33,678 33,272 41,769



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.12: Effect of Having a Twin Sibling <6
Girls
Years Education Weekly Study Hours Educational Progress
Twins-2 Twins-3 Twins-2 Twins-3 Twins-2 Twins-3
Children 6-18
Has Twin Sib. <6 -0.037 -0.132 0.005 0.054
(0.094) (0.039)*** (0.058) (0.048)
Obs. 6,901 14,324 1,388 2,733
Children 6-11
Has Twin Sib. <6 -0.039 -0.169 0.007 0.096
(0.107) (0.051)*** (0.063) (0.057)*
Obs. 6,366 10,955 1,297 2,144
Children 12-18
Has Twin Sib. <6 -0.016 -0.018 0.079 -0.024 -0.071 -0.094
(0.032) (0.023) (0.121) (0.086) (0.146) (0.074)
Obs. 535 3,369 535 3,367 91 589
Children 12-15
Has Twin Sib. <6 -0.021 0 0.01 0.044 -0.047 -0.063
(0.031) (0.022) (0.098) (0.088) (0.161) (0.068)
Obs. 471 2,765 471 2,763 79 481
Boys
Years Education Weekly Study Hours Educational Progress
Twins-2 Twins-3 Twins-2 Twins-3 Twins-2 Twins-3
Children 6-18
Has Twin Sib. <6 -0.103 0.025 0.066 0.032
(0.061)* (0.072) (0.054) (0.062)
Obs. 7,286 14,577 1,471 2,742
Children 6-11
Has Twin Sib. <6 -0.117 0.039 0.078 0.007
(0.066)* (0.095) (0.055) (0.053)
Obs. 6,794 10,998 1,384 2,092
Children 12-18
Has Twin Sib. <6 0.093 -0.025 0.037 -0.032 -0.015 0.12
(0.025)*** (0.025) (0.149) (0.080) (0.111) (0.194)
Obs. 492 3,579 492 3,579 87 650
Children 12-15
Has Twin Sib. <6 0.084 -0.035 0.043 -0.062 0.026 0.166
(0.026)*** (0.025) (0.149) (0.077) (0.113) (0.215)






















































































This thesis has investigated several ways in which the family is impor-
tant for economic outcomes. Specifically, I have examined the time cost of
additional children in the family, the role of household English skills in im-
migrant self-employment, and the effect of additional siblings on children’s
education. The results show that family and the household have an impor-
tant effect on individuals’ time use, employment decisions, and investment
in human capital. However, when endogeneity is controlled for, estimates of
women’s time use in the house is much smaller than simple OLS results would
indicate, and the effect of children on siblings’ education is observed only for
younger children.
In the second chapter, I analyze the effect of an additional child on
time use in the home. While it has long been recognized that decisions on
the amount of time spent doing housework are endogenous to decisions about
fertility, it is difficult to find suitable instruments which allow the time cost of
an additional child to be measured without bias. I take advantage of a unique
data set which combines a large number of observations with questions on
weekly hours of housework and information on all members of the household
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to create a twins instrument which is exogenous to desired fertility for a given
birth.
As expected, the data shows specialization of time use in Mexican
households. While labor force participation of Mexican women has risen dra-
matically in recent decades, women continue to do almost all of the housework
in the family. Mexican women increase their housework in response to an ad-
ditional small child to the household. However, the increase is smaller than
what might have been expected — only 3.5 hours. Approximately 1.2 hours
of the increase comes from reduced leisure time. Spouses also increase house-
work in response to an additional child, by 1.2 hours, but have no reduction
in leisure. The simple OLS estimates for the time cost of a child are also
low, representing only a 13% increase on average in women’s housework hours
compared to hours before pregnancy. The OLS estimates are much greater for
the first child, although men help out more for twins when there are already
two previous births, indicating that as the value of time becomes very high,
men do help out.
Rather than indicating that children are not time-intensive, I believe
the results indicate that time use within the household is flexible and women
can substitute their time from less productive home care activities to child
care. In addition, the reduction in housework hours by itself may not be the
primary impact of a young child. The timing of child care activities and the
need to be available at all times may interfere with other types of production at
home, in the workplace, and in leisure. How spouses divide the timing and type
151
of housework activities is an area that might be investigated. Specialization
may occur not only between housework and market production, but between
tasks that require one parent to be “on-call” and tasks that can be scheduled
or performed on a more flexible basis as time becomes available.
Reductions in the quality of production are also of interest. One aspect
of quality reduction that has been studied is the effect of additional children
on the development of siblings, although this has usually been framed as a
reduction in time devoted to other children, not a reduction in efficiency.
Finally, it would be of interest to examine how responsibility for home
production is evolving over time. There has been a trend in developed countries
for men to take more interest in child care, which is related to trends towards
flexible work arrangements, to technological advances in the home, and to the
increase in contracting and shorter tenures. Again, this may lead to different
types of specialization within the home rather than the traditional division
between home and market production. While this trend is likely to be more
pronounced in the U.S. and Europe, the availability of additional years of the
ENEU might provide the basis for such a study in Mexico. The roles of family
in Mexico and the U.S. have been very different in the past. Will Mexican
families come to resemble families in the U.S. more in terms of their time use?
The third chapter develops a simple model to show how trade in house-
hold English skills might encourage immigrant self-employment. While economists
and sociologists have examined the role of English in self-employment in the
context of immigrant enclaves, this is the first analysis that has examined
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household English skills within the family and proposed an economic theory
of how they might influence employment decisions. I use the U.S. Census to
examine the hypothesis that individuals from households with a wider spread
of English skills are more likely to be self-employed. I find that, in accordance
with my model, a greater range of English skills in the household is associated
with higher self-employment rates overall and for men who speak good or very
good English. Also, the presence of someone with different language skills
in the household encourages self-employment for both poor English speakers
and very good English speakers. The percent increase in the probability of
self-employment is fairly large.
This model might be adapted to examine other ways in which immi-
grants use self-employment or work together to minimize disadvantages they
might face in the U.S. labor market. Immigrants might face signaling prob-
lems in translating overseas education into jobs in the U.S.. Self-employment
may allow households an opportunity to provide work for family members who
might otherwise not be able to find work in the wage labor market, such as
young or old workers or workers willing to work for less than the minimum
wage.
The fourth chapter examines the impact of an additional sibling on
children’s education. This is a topic that has been extensively studied, but
generally without adequately controlling for endogeneity between the desired
and actual number of children and educational decisions. I find that addi-
tional siblings have an observed negative effect on children’s education only
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for younger children. While the measure of education is coarse and does not
account for quality, it appears that children who fall behind later catch up.
Timing and age of the additional sibling matter, but the results vary by the
instrument used. A close additional sibling has more of a negative impact for
both girls and boys, but still no long-term effect.. For girls, a younger sibling
in a family with more at least three births is associated with lower education.
For boys 12-18, however, there is a positive effect on education to having a
second sibling under the age of 5.
The data does not provide robust support for the quality-quantity
model in the Mexican case. While the theory is appealing, the data pro-
vides more support for a model in which families compensate in other ways to
achieve a target level of education. This implies that families tastes for educa-
tion and the skill level of mothers determine education levels, not the number
of children. In this context, coercive fertility reduction programs would have
no direct effect on education levels, unless they changed the attitudes of client
families. In the context of a system where educational opportunities are rel-
ative widespread and individual costs of education are not overwhelming, it
may be that long-term benefits of education far outweigh the changes in the
relative price of education caused by the birth of an additional child. These
results are specific to urban areas of Mexico. Children in other countries, or
in the Mexican countryside, may face different costs of education and may
respond differently.
The paper indicates, however, that there are complex interactions be-
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tween siblings. The question of how the relative spacing of births affects
children’s development warrants further investigation. It may be that older
boys benefit from having more parental time spent in the home. The presence
of a young child may reduce the per child cost of spending time in the house
and increase “public time” parents spend in the house which is shared by all
children.
Overall, the role of family is important. Different family structures
lead to different outcomes. Family and household structures in the U.S. and
Mexico are changing in response to economic development and social trends,
How individuals are effected by this change is an important question for future
research. The smaller estimates of estimates of the effect of a child accounting
for endogeneity compared to simple OLS estimates emphasize the importance
of addressing simultaneity issues. It is also difficult to model who is making
family decisions and on what basis. However, with numerous household data
sets becoming available in a wide range of countries, there is great scope for
additional research into family relationships and economic outcomes.
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